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ASSUMING THE RISK: TORT LAW, POLIC Y, AND 
POLITICS ON THE SLIPPERY SLOPESt 
Er ic A .  Feldman * 
Alison Ste in** 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, the tort doctrine 
of assumption of risk has served as legal shorthand for the idea that 
individuals are responsible for the consequences of their own risk-tak­
ing preferences. Indeed , one of the most famous Latin maxims in the 
common law corpus- vo lent i  non fit injuria-indicates that those who 
freely take chances have only themselves to blame for their harms . !  
Yet this seemingly simple legal concept has been freighted with politi­
cal and moral tensions for over a century, and it has been attacked as 
"sinister" 2 and "dangerously misleading."3 As Justice Felix Frank­
furter pointedly wrote, 
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustrat ion of the 
extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase 
begins life as a l i terary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repeti­
tion; and repetition soon establishes it  as a legal formula, undiscrim­
inatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory 
ideas.4 
This Article uses a case study approach to take a fresh look at the 
assumption of risk doctrine .  Focusing on ski accidents, it argues that 
'f We are grateful to Tom Baker. John Fagan. Umberto [zzo. Gideon Parchamovsky .  Robert 
Rabin. and all of the participants in the 15th Annual Clifford Symposium for their helpful 
comments and feedback. Timothy Von Dulm and the rest of the s taff of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School Library provided extraordinary research help. S upport for this paper 
was generously provided by a University of Pennsylvania Law School Summer Research Grant. 
* Professor of Law. University of Pennsylvania Law School: Visi t ing Professor of Law. S tan­
ford Law School (2008-2009). 
** J.D" University of Pennsylvania Law School: Law Clerk to the Honorable Kent A. Jor-
dan. United States Court of Appeal s  for the 1l1ird Circui t .  
1 .  See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co" 166 N.E. 173. 174 (N.Y. 1929). 
2. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN. A HISTOR'I OF ArvlERICAN L.<\w 413 (1973). 
3. S tephen D. Sugarman. The J\I/OIISlIl1tO Lecture: Assumption of Risk. 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 
833. 835-36 (1997) (suggesting that  "when we are tempted to say 'assumption of risk' we sho uld 
instead say something else." such as '' 'no breach.' 'no duty.' 'no cause.' and 'no proximate 
cause . .
. 
· because assumption of risk is an inaccurate and "confusing substitute for each of 
them").  
4. Tiller v.  Atl .  Coast Line RR .. 318 U.S. 54. 68 (1943) (Frankfurter. 1.. concurring ) .  
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although judges and legal scholars have overwhelmingly engaged in 
the idea of  assumed risk as  a matter of legal doctrine,S the political , 
economic, and ideological dimensions of the assumption of risk are 
both more interesting and more important .  Doctrinally, conflicts over 
ski injuries vividly illustrate why assumed risk points in such different 
directions. From one perspective , skiers are precisely the types of in­
dividuals who ought to bear the cost of their injuries. Skiing is a 
purely recreational activity in which people freely chose to participate . 
It  is clearly dangerous, resulting in injuries that range from minor 
scrapes to physical impairment and death. Many of the risks it entails 
are obvious: falls due to conditions such as ice and mogUls ,  and colli­
sions with objects such as trees, ski towers, and snowmaking equip­
ment.° However, it is also the case that the owners and operators of 
ski resorts can reduce the overall incidence and cost of accidents by 
taking reasonable precautions to eliminate unnecessary dangers on 
the slopes . 7  Determining liability for ski accidents thus requires a 
complex calculus of risk that accepts the reality that skiing is danger­
ous and wil l inevitably lead to some injuries, reflects the individualistic 
ethos of American legal culture by holding skiers accountable for 
their actions,S and creates incentives both for skiers to exercise care 
when skiing and for resort owners and operators to offer skiers a rea­
sonably safe skiing environment.9 In almost every case that we have 
examined, reasonable minds could and do differ on the question of 
liability; there is no cookbook-like formula for drawing a line between 
the risks that are legitimately taken by the skier and those risks that 
embody the carelessness of defendant ski resort owners and 
operators. 
But there is far more to an understanding of the assumption of risk 
doctrine than is revealed by a focus on tort law doctrine alone. Cru­
cial  to the assumed risk debate is the powerful influence of pol itics 
and economics on the manner in which courts define and operational-
5.  As every torts casebook indicates. the assumption o f  risk doctrine is  not a single doctrine. 
but rather a set of more-or-less related doctrines. This Article focuses on primary implied as­
sumption of risk .  not implied or express assumption of risk. the firefighter's rule. or other legal 
concepts that have been called "the assumption of risk." 
6. See infi"o Part II.C. 
7. See inti'({ text accompanying note 208. 
8. In 1906. Francis Bohlen wrote that  assumption of risk was "a terse expression of the indi­
vidualistic tendency of the common law. which. proceeding from the people and asserting their 
liberties. naturally regards the freedom of individual action as t he keystone of the whole struc­
ture." Francis H. Bohlen. Voll/Illary Assllmption of Risk. 20 HARV. L. REV. 14. 14 (1906). 
9. See generally L\WKENCE M. FRIED/VIA '. TOTAL JlIST/CE (1985) (discussing the high degree 
to which Americans have developed expectations of recompense for whatever injuries they 
suffer). 
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ize risks . lo The ski industry is essential to the economy of some states, 
and the insurance industry is critical to the successful operation of the 
ski industry. Together, they have lobbied aggressively for protective 
state legislation. The result has been the legislative enactment of ski 
safety statutes that are intended to shield the industry from liability. I I 
For several decades, these statutes have structured the legal conflict 
over ski accidents . 1 2  Allocating responsibility for accidents on the 
slopes, therefore,  is fraught with economic and political tension, and 
the seemingly j urisprudential and doctrina l  debate over the assump­
tion of risk is, in reality, heavily shaped by the political and cultural 
climate in which it exists. 1 3 
Our goal in this Article is neither to argue in favor of an existing 
doctrinal interpretation of assumed risk nor to propose an alternat ive 
formulation . Although we are in accord with many of the doctrine's 
critics and are sympathetic to the view that it is conceptually imper­
fect, we are more interested in analyzing how the assumption of r isk 
operates in pract ice than we are in engaging a set of hypotheticals. 14 
What one learns from a detailed examination of ski accidents , we ar­
gue , is that regardless of the scholarly criticism of the assumption of 
risk doctrine , the far-ranging material interests implicated by the doc­
trine guarantee its continued salience . Powerful political and eco­
nomic actors with links to the ski industry value the idea of assumed 
risk, and they have worked hard to keep the concept alive in the judi­
cial realm. IS The financial interests of those actors have caused them 
to promote the view that the cost of accidents suffered by skiers 
should be borne by the skiers because those who ski are presumed to 
1 0. See int;'n Part III. 
11. ld. 
1 2. ld. 
1 3 . The question of how to allocate liability in ski accident cases is part of a more general 
social conversation over risk and responsibility that animates the broader tort reform debate. 
Almost every important work that has attacked tort litigation in the United States has champi­
oned the importance of individual responsibility and bemoaned the perceived tendency of indi­
viduals to take risks but avoid responsibility for the harms that result from such risks. Se(' 
generally MARY ANN GLENDON. RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIS­
COLIRSE ( 1 991 ): WILLIAIVI HALTO M  & MICHAEL MCCANN. DISTORTIN(; THE LAW: POLITICS. ME. 
DIA, AND THE LrTI(iATION CRISIS (2004): PHILI P  K. HOWARD. THE DEATH OF COMIIoION SENSE: 
How LAW Is SUFFOCATING AMER ICA (! 994): WALTER K. OLSON. THE LITICiATION EXPLOSION: 
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEAS H ED THE LAWSUIT (1991 ): CHAR LES J. SY KES. A 
NATION OF VICIlMS: THE DECAY OF THE AIIoIERICAN CHARACfER (1992). 
14. Similarly. Peter Schuck argues that the assumption of risk doctrine implicates "evolving 
social norms concerning fundamental issues of morality: the meaning of fairness. reciprocity in 
relationships. the extent of free will. individual responsibility for choice. and the like." See Petcr 
H. Schuck. Rerilinking Illformed COl1senr. 1 03 YALE L.J. 899. 9 1 2 (1993). 
15. See illt;·£( texl accompanying note 110. 
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have knowingly engaged in a risky activity. By pointing to politics and 
economics as a critical factor in the persistence of the doctrine of as­
sumed risk,  we seek to politically and culturally contextualize what we 
believe has been an unduly narrow legal debate among tort law 
scholars.  
Moreover, by analyzing litigation over ski accidents in three ski-in­
tensive states-Vermont, Colorado, and Cal ifornia-it becomes clear 
that the outcome of a ski-related conflict that is decided under the 
rubric of assumed risk is not mechanically determined by the exis­
tence of forcefully articulated material interests. In fact, defendants in 
California have fared far better than those in Vermont and Colorado, 
even though California is the only one of the three states that has not 
passed a statute designed to shield the ski industry from liability.16 
Vermont, in contrast was home to the first such legislation, but the 
courts in that state are as likely to award damages to inj ured skiers as 
they are to find for defendants. 1 7 In short, we argue that politics and 
financial interest are critical to the "law-in-action" of assumed risk, 
but we emphasize how diverse and sometimes unexpected j udicial 
outcomes emerge despite the shadow of such influences. IS 
In Part II of this Article, we describe the emergence of skiing as a 
popular sport in the United States, we highlight its economic import in 
particular states, and we present general data on the risks of skiing 
through an overview of ski-related accidents and deaths. Part I I I  re­
views the historical and conceptual development of the assumption of 
risk as a tort law doctrine, detailing both the contemporary criticisms 
leveled against the doctrine and its application to cases that involve 
injured skiers. In Part IV we turn to the politics of the assumption of 
risk doctrine and tell the story of how the National Ski Areas Associa­
tion and the insurance industry lobbied state legislatures in an effort 
to codify the assumption of risk doctrine in order to protect the indus­
try from potentially expensive personal injury cases. Part V provides 
a detailed assessment of the case law in three states in which skiing 
has particular economic importance : Vermont, Colorado, and Califor­
nia. Although there are various types of ski-related claims-including 
ski resort employees who sue their employers for injuries suffered on 
the slopes, skiers who sue ski equipment manufacturers, and skiers 
who sue one another-our emphasis is on litigation brought by in­
jured skiers against ski resorts because those cases are the most com­
mon, involve the largest sums of money, and most directly implicate 
l6. See inti'{( Part V.e. 
17. Sce infi"iI Part V.A. 
I K See inti'a Part V. 
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the notion of assumed risk. Two of the states we investigate , Vermont 
and Colorado, have ski safety statutes that are meant to shield resort 
owners and operators from liability, whereas California has not en­
acted protective legislation .  Intriguingly, we find that despite the lack 
of legislation, defendants fare better in California than e lsewhere, 
while p laintiffs have been particularly successful in Colorado, which is 
home to an early statute that was l ater revised and strengthened . 
Overal l ,  although the data is imperfect, a careful look at judicial opin­
ions from the past several decades reveals that regardless of whether 
plain tiffs or defendants prevail ,  the doctrine of assumption of risk re­
mains a critical  part of the case l aw. In the face of persistent academic 
criticism and predictions by some influential scholars that the assump­
tion of risk doctrine was a relic of the past whose disappearance would 
usher i n  an era of plaintiff recovery, I') the doctrine continues to exert a 
powerful influence on how disputes over ski-related harms are re­
solved. In Part V, we conclude by reviewing the central claims of the 
Article and draw anal ogies to other areas of the law in \"hich the as­
sumption of risk doctri ne rema ins critical. 
II. SKIIl'·j(; IN ArvlERICA 
An article discussing legislative efforts in Vermont to impose the 
burden of ski i njuries on injured sk iers states, "Give ski areas the 
courage to reduce the r isks they can ,  skiers the strength to accept 
those that they cannot, und j uries the wisdom to know the differ­
ence. " 20 The struggle to determine those risks that ski areas have a 
legal duty to reduce and th ose that wil l  be borne by skiers has loomed 
large throughout the hiswry of American skiing. 
While the origins of skiing in America can be traced to 1854,2' the 
sport did not become popular until the end of World War I I ,  when 
soldiers re turned from Europe and brought ski equipment into the 
United States.22 The construction of the Interstate Highway System, 
authorized by President Dwight Eisenhower through the passage of 
19. See Sc huck. slIpra note: 1-1. at 911--12 ('The dominant approach has been to eliminate or 
narrow the defense. thereby facilitating plaintiffs' recoveries.") (citing W. PA(;E KEETON ET AL . . 
PR{)SSEg & KEET{)N ON HIE L.-\w OF T{)RTS � AX. at 493-95 (5th ed. 19K+». 
2U. Beth Robinson. f'lm'il1g II Sufe: AI/ucurillg Ihe Risk of Harlll Oil rlie Slopes. 25 VI'. 13 . .1. & 
L. 01(;. ["Jar. 1999. at 15. 15. 
2J. There are numerous newspaper records of competitive skiing among California mining 
camp populations. See E. JOII!' B.  ALLEN. FIU)!'.I SKISPORT TO SKIINC;: ONE HUNDRED YEARS 
OF AN AtvlEI{ICAN SPOI{T. lo4U-19-W. al 21-2X (1903). 
22. SeC' Peter Kaineg. Chris Van Valkenburg & Carsten Winsncs. Issues Facing Ski Safety 
Research () (Apr. .?A. 2()06) (unpubli�;ht:cl interactive qualifying project report submitted in par­
lial fulfillment of the requirements for lhe degree of Bache l or of Science. W()rcester Polytechnic 
Inslitute) (on file with author) [hefeil;aflcr Ski SafelY Research]. 
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the 1 956 Federal-Aid Highway Act , contributed to the growth of ski­
ing by improving access to ski areas in remote and difficult-to-access 
places.2J Over the second half of the twentieth century, the sport 
quickly evolved into a $10 billion industry. 2.:1 In 2006 , there were 485 
ski resorts operating in the United States,25 with an estimated 6.4 mil­
lion skiers and 5 .2 million snowboarders who made 55 . 1 million visits 
to the resorts during the 2006-2007 season.26 
Owning a ski resort has always been a profitable endeavor. Ac­
cording to the 2005/06 Ski Resort Industry Research Compendium of 
the National Ski Areas Association (NSAA) ,27 which includes re­
sponses from over 200 resorts, accounting for 47 .9 million ski visits,2?-\ 
the average gross revenue of a resort is $21.9 million, with an average 
operating profit margin of 24.4% or $5 .3 million per ski resort area .2LJ 
The typical price of a weekend lift ticket now exceeds $60.3() Ski re-
2:>. See Federal-Aid H ighway Act of 1956.70 Stat. 374 (1956) (current version at :z:; U.s.C 
� WI (2()()('i). -Ole bill. commonly referred to as the National Interstate and Defense Highways 
Act. appropriatt.:d $25 billion for 41.0{)() miles of interstate highways and was the largest public 
works project in America ,lt the time. PENNS'{LVANIA HIGHW,\Y INFORMATION ASs"N. R(),,,>!) 
I(l PR()SPERITY: 2lsT CENTlfRY TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRllCTliRE 4. avai/ublt! (II www.aaapa. 
org/Roacl2Prosperity-secun;web.pdf (citing Pub. L. No. 84-627. 70 Stat. 374 111)56)). 
24. NXI'·I. SKI AI<EA Ass'N & RCC Assocs. (NSAA). 20()5/Oo SKI RESORT INDl:sTRY RE­
SE.'>' R(II COMPE'i f) Il!� I 0. 9 (20(J6). ({vlIiill/JIe a/ http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/marketing/docs/0506·re­
search-compendium.pdf. This figure was calculated by multiplying the 2005-2006 average gross 
revenue per ski resort ($21 .9 million) by the number of ski resorts in the United States at the 
time ( .. +7S ski resorts). 
2). Sec Press Release. NSAA. 481 Ski Resorts in Operation During 2007-20lJS Scason (July 
21). 200S). http://www .nsaa.org/nsaa/press/operating-ski-areas.asp (outlining the numbe r of ski rc­
sorts in America by ski season from 1985 through 2007). 
26. Press Release. NSAA. Final Report Indicates 55.1 Million Visits in 2006107 (Aug. 920(7). 
http://www.I1saa.org/nsaa/press/070S/kottke-2007.asp C' A skier/snowboarder visit is defined as 
one �'ers()n visiting a ski area for all or part of a day or night. and includes full- and half-clay. 
night . complimcntary. adult. child. scason and other types of tickets."). Over the last tcn seasons 
(l91)7-1998 through 2006-20(7). there has been an average of 55.57 million visits recorded annu­
allv. Ill.: see illso NSAA. Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding Safety. http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/ 
press/facts-ski-snbd-safety.asp (last visited Sept. 9. 2007). 
13.9 percent of snowboardcrs also ski. and conversely. 12.8 percent of skiers also 
snowboard. 1l1<:�refore. the total on-slope participants were calculated at 9.2 million. 
(13.9 percent of 5. 1 mil l ion snowboarders equals 708.9()O. 5.J million minus 708.900 
equals 4.4 million snowboarders. 12.8 percent of 5.5 million skiers equals 704.000. 5.5 
million minus 704.00() equals 4.8 million skiers.) 
Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding Safety. supra. 
27. NSAA. About the National Ski Areas Association. http://www.nsaa.orginsaa/home/ahollt. 
asp (--TIle [NSAA I is the trade association for ski area owners and operators. It represents 320 
alpine resorts that account for more than 90 percent of the skier/snowboarcler visits nationwide. 
Additiona lly. it has -to() suppl ier members who provide equipment. goods and services to the 
nlUuntain resort industrv.··). Iti. 
2;.). NSAA. SIIP/,U note 24. at 2. 
�l). Id. at 9 . 
.. �(). !d at :' . 9. 
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sorts derive 46.3 % of their revenues from lift ticket sales, and the 
NSAA considers the ability to regularly increase the price of l ift tick­
ets to be a crit ica l  factor in the overall financial health of the business 
because lift tickets are the single largest revenue producer of the 
industry. 3! 
Ski  resorts do not only benefit their individual or corporate owners. 
The ski industry also plays an enormous role in many state economies. 
In  New Hampshire. for example, the ski industry provides ten percent 
of all jobs in the winter months,32 and the California Ski Industry As­
sociation reports that " the California winter sports industry generates 
$500 million annually to the economy, employs 15 ,000 people, and 
hosts an average of eight million skiers seasonally . "33 Many "ski  
safety statutes"34 candidly describe the important role that skiing 
plays in the state's economy, thereby alluding to the need for the state 
legisl ature to protect the industry from crushing liability. In short, ski­
ing is a major industry that is critical to the economy of some states 
and offers an a ttractive recreational opportunity to a large number of 
people. But i t  also results in a significant number of serious accidents. 
Although everyone involved in skiing agrees that it can be danger­
ous, it is surprisingly d ifficult to obtain reliable information about ski­
related injuries or deaths. 35 Aside from a series of research projects 
that examine patterns of ski injury against the backdrop of equipment, 
environmental conditions, or both,36 most of the available data re­
garding actual fatalities and serious injuries comes from the ski indus­
try itself.37 The NSAA reports that during the past ten years there has 
3L lei. at 9-10. 
32. Keep Winter Cool. Why S hould I Care'>. http://www.keepwintercool.org/whyshouldicare. 
html ("Keep Winter Cool is a partnership between NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Coun­
cil) and the N ational Ski Areas Association (NSAA) to raise visibility and public understanding 
of global warming and spotlight opportunities that exist right now to start fixing the problem."). 
33. California Ski & Snowhoard Safety Ass·n. U.S. Ski  & Snowboarding General Facts. {/\'ail­
al>le Ilf http://74.12:'i.93.132/search 'lq=cache:tOEYlznSv lcJ:www.calskisafety.orgireports/general­
facts. h tml + % 22ca I i f om i a  +sk i + ind ustry+associa tion % 22 +and + % 22 winter +sports+ ind ustry % 22 + 
and+ %22generates+ %24500+million %22&cd= I &hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
34. See Charles J. Sanders & Jacqueline Gayner. The Cold Tr/lrh: Have Allameys Really Chil­
led (he Ski Indusrry). 2 FORDHAM EN"r. MEDIA & INTELL. PRO!'. L.F. 125.131-32 (1991). 
35. See, e.g.. Nichol<ls Bakalar. SlIlIImer Sparrs Are Among rhe Sufest. N.Y. TIMES. July 8. 
2008, at F7 (noting thai summer sports are relatively safe and that ··the most dangerous outdoor 
recreational activity by a wide margi n  is snowboarding. followed by sledding." citing a study 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 
36. See, e.g . . Jasper Shealy. Carl F. Ettliilger & Robert Johnson. Signu/ Detecriol1 Theun': A 
/v1(1del (or Evululfting Ri:leusdRerenri()n Crileri({ in Alpille Ski-Binding-Book S"stem.l. ill 1 2  S KI­
IN(; TR.-\lJi\IA & SAFETY 120-31 (Ruben J .  Johnson cd . . 199Y). 
37. Ski Sai"et)' R,'scarch. supra note 22. at I (noting that. with the exception of Sugarbush, 
"most ski arc,ls me ilOt cuoperalivc in conclucting injury studies"). 
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been an average of 43 .6 serious injuries3B and 39.8 ski- or snowboard­
related deaths per year.39 During the 2007-2008 season, 60.5 million 
visits by skiers and snowboarders resulted in 41  serious inj uries and 53 
fatalities;40 the vast maj ority of accident victims are men: 28 men died 
on the slopes, and 25 men suffered serious injury.4 1 It is important to 
note that one's chance of dying or experiencing serious injury when 
skiing or snowboarding is relatively small . Indeed, in  contrast to the 
53  fatalities per 60.5 million visits by skiers and snowboarders in 
2007-2008, in 2006, there were 3 ,600 drowning deaths per 58  million 
swimmers, and 1 , 100 fatalities per 43 . 1  million bicyclists .42 Yet the 
NSAA's emphasis on death and serious injury, and its seemingly nar­
row definition of what constitutes a serious injury, may underplay the 
real risks faced by skiers and snowboarders . Although the NSAA 
does not provide public data  on the full range of injuries that occur on 
the slopes, Jasper Shealy, a professor of engineering at Rochester In­
stitute of Technology, has studied ski injuries for three decades and 
offers a dramatically different perspective from that of the NSAA.43 
He reports nearly 15 ,000 skier and snowboarder inj uries annually, 
many of which could potentially end up in court .44 With figures rang­
ing from the NSSA's reported annual average of 43 .7 serious injuries 
to Shealy's claim of almost 15 ,000 hurt skiers, the lack of fine-grained 
data on the number and type of ski injuries in the United States makes 
it difficult to (1) estimate the number of tort claims that could be 
brought by skiers, and (2) compare i t  to the number of claims actually 
filed, the number of cases resolved by judicial opinion, and the num­
ber of estimated settlements. But with over 80 deaths or catastrophic 
injuries occurring on the slopes each year, and thousands-perhaps 
tens of thousands-of additional personal harms suffered by skiers 
and snowboarders, the potential for legal conflict over who is respon­
sible for such harms is  significant .  
38. NSAA. Facts About S k iing/Snowboarding. supra note 26 (defining "serious injuries" as 
·'paraplegics. seriolls head and other serious injuries"). 
39. fd. 
40. Jd. ("TI1e rate of fatali ty converts to AO per million skier/snowboarder visits . . . .  The rate 
of serious injury . . .  was .73 per million skier/snowboarder visits. ") . 
.+1. ld. 
42. frl. 
43. Sarah Tuff. Slifetl' Oil file Slopes: Easy fO Say hUi Harder 10 Ensure. N.Y . TIMES. Mar. 2. 
2006. at G8 (discussing Shealy's study and noting the anxie ty over accidents on the slopes) . 
44. Jr!. 
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I I I .  TORT LAW AND THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
A. Historical Development 
26 7 
There have always been individuals who are willing to engage in  
activities that others consider overly dangerous . But i t  was not until 
the latter half of the nineteenth century that the common law explic­
itly addressed the legal consequences of injuries that resulted from 
risky undertakings. Tort law was becoming an independent area of 
the law in that era, distinct from contracts , property, and criminal law, 
but in many instances, universal notions of duty were overshadowed 
by an emphasis on status relationships. Francis Hill iard's 1859 book 
on torts, the first such treatise to appear in the United States, intro­
duced the notion of assumption of risk to American courts . Hilliard's 
view of assumed risk made clear that the concept of assumed risk was 
closely tied to the relationship between the parties: "[1]£ a defective 
condition 'was known to the servant . . .  and the servant continued in 
the service he assumed the risk himself. ' "4'1 Over the next several de­
cades, the idea of assumption of risk was freed from the specific con­
text of the master-servant relationship posited by Hilliard . Francis 
vVharton's 1878 Treatise on the Law o f  Negligen ce ,  for example, de­
scribed the assumption of risk doctrine as a "general principle that a 
party cannot recover for inj ury he incurs in  risks, themselves legiti ­
mate, to which he intell igently submits himself. "46 In 1895, Charles 
Warren underscored the rejection of status relationships as the under­
lying justification for applying the assumption of risk doctrine by 
presenting assumed risk as a rule of law regarding a plain tiff's conduct 
that is a part of the general law of negligence .47 
By the first years of the twentieth century, the law of torts became 
further refined, and the theory of negligence was increasingly used to 
limit defendants' l iability. As a result, the idea of assumption of risk 
was widely summed up by the Latin phrase volenti non fit in juria (to a 
willing person, no injury is done), with courts generally unsympathetic 
to injured plaintiffs who made a decision to knowingly engage in cer­
tain risks .48 In Lamson v. American Axe & Too l  Co ., Oliver vVendell 
Holmes denied recovery to Lamson ,  an employee of an axe manufac­
turer who was injured when a hatchet fel l  from a defective rack .49 AI-
45. G. ED\VARD WI lITE. TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTllAL HISTORY 42 (expanded 
eel. 20(3) (quoting F. HILLIARD. THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIV,c\TF WRONGS 467 (3d ed. 1860)). 
46. FRANCIS WHARTON. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 181 (2e1 ed. Un1:\). 
47. See WHITE. supra note 45. at 42-43. 
48. Jane P. North. ElIlplol'ees ASSlIrIIP{iul1 uf Risk: Real or !/Il/sor." Choice.') 52 TENN. L. REV. 
35.38 (IY1:\4). 
4Y. 58 N.E. 585. 51:\5 (iVlass. ]YOO). 
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though Lamson had expressed concern about the stabi l ity of the rack 
and the safety of working underneath it, his employer insisted that he 
would be forced to either accept the condition of the rack or quit his 
job. 50 In Holmes' view, the employee "appreciated the danger more 
than any one else. He perfectly understood what was likely to hap­
pen . . . .  He stayed,  and took the risk . "5 1 As a result, he was the 
author of his own fate ,  and consequently, he must bear the costs of his 
accident. 
Holmes'  approach to assumed risk held sway for the first several 
decades of the twentieth century, and it left plaintiffs with little hope 
of recovering for injuries that resulted from their own informed 
choices.52 Justice Benj amin Cardozo's 1 929 opinion in Murph y v. 
Steep lechase Amu sement Co. -a colorful case involving a young man 
injured on a Coney Island amusement ride called "the Flopper"-fur­
ther sol idified the notion that those who take risks must bear the con­
sequences. 53 Justice Cardozo wrote, 
Volenti non fit i njuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts 
the dangers that i n here in it so far as they are obvious and neces­
sary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist or 
a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball . ... 
The plaintiff was n ot seeking a retre at for med itation . ... T11e tim­
orous may stay at home.5-1 
According to Justice Cardozo, the plaintiff's inj ury was the result of 
" the very hazard that was invited and foreseen. " 55 As such, l iability 
could not be imposed on Steeplechase, which had merely provided an 
entertaining diversion for willing participants. Like Lamson's hatchet 
wound, Murphy's injuries were the result of his decision to knowingly 
and willingly take a risk ,  and he alone was responsible for the unfortu­
nate consequence . "There would have been no point to the whole 
thing, no adventure about it, if the risk had not been there ," Cardozo 
wrote . "The very name, above the gate, 'the Flopper: was warning to 
the timid. "56 
The approach to assumed risk that emerged in the nineteenth cen­
tury, and that was hardened by Holmes and Cardozo in the early 
twentieth century, began to erode after vYodd War II, as tort law 
50. Id. at 5�5 ("The plaintiff complai ned to the superintendent  . . . land h]e was answered. in 
substa nce. that he would have to use the racks or leave."). 
51. Id. 
52. See, e.g . . Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co . .  Ifi6 N.E. 173.174 (N.Y. IY2Y). 
5.3. Id. 
54. M (citations omitted). 
55. Id. 
50. M 
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moved toward a greater emphasis on compensation. The introduction 
of liability insurance played an important role in that transform a­
tion ,s7 as did social norms that conceptualized accidental harms as a 
societal rather than an individual problem. Starting in the late 1 940s, 
and accelerating in the 1960s and 1970s, legal scholars and the courts 
displayed a growing skepticism of the narrow approach to the assump­
tion of risk doctrine-which consistently imposed the cost of accide nts 
on the inj ured-and embraced a newfound willingness to provide 
awards to plaintiffs whose claims would have been denied by earlier 
courts. Doctrinal and legislative innovations, like strict liability and 
worker's compensation, provided avenues to redress that enabled 
p laintiffs to sidestep the law of negligence and the possibility that  their 
claims would falter with the successful invocation of the assumption of 
risk doctrine .sl' The result was that  injured parties. even t h ose who 
k nowingly had embraced particular risks, were more likely to be com­
pensated for their harms than in any other period in Americc\n 
history.59 
The expansion of liability that reached a peak in the 1970s would 
prove to be short l ived . In response to the r ise in  unemployment  and 
high inflation of the 1970s, i n  the early 1980s , the Reagan Administra­
tion ushered in an era of conservative retrenchment that  emph asized 
the need to heal the ailing economy and shrink the size of the federal 
government .A( ) Reflecting the tenor of the times, by the mid- J 980s , 
tort law schol ars and courts began to move away from their emphasis 
on compensation and instead embraced values l ike deterrence. 111eo­
ries based on economic concepts such as market e fficiency took prece­
dence over social  welfare concerns and distributive j ustice theories, 
and skepticism about the government's abili ty to effect ively concep­
tualize and implement solutions to soci al  problems led to an emphasis 
on individual responsibility .A 1  With its inherently deterrent-based ra­
tionale and its focus on individual behavior, the notion of assumption 
of risk was ready-made for the times. Once again, courts were in  the 
57.  S('(' W I-I ITE' . .  wpm n o t e  4 5 .  a t  1 49.  
5�.  M at  24.'i . 
.'it) .  L-\W}{ENCE M. F R I E l ) ,vI AN.  A H I STO RY OF ArvI E R lCAN LAW 52 1-23 (3J cd. 2( )O.'i ) :  K i:::N ­
:-';ETI- l  S .  A B RAf lAi'v1 .  T H E  L I A BI LITY CENTl I R Y :  I N S L I R ANCE A N D  TO RT LAW F}{( )i\I  I I- ! !' P ,'J ) ( iR ES­
S I \: I-:  ERA TO t)/ l l . at 1 7 1 -72 ( 2( )OS ) .  
6 0  . .  ')(,(, gCl1l'rlllh' H ,\ LTOM & MCCANN . supra note 1 3 .  
6 1 .  Id. a t  2 2  ( " ' We refer especi a l lv  t o  the speci fic "ethic of  i n d i vidua l ism " that  emph asizes se l t­
rel iance.  tough ness. and au tonomy-q uali ties that are pose d as being cen tra l to prllgrc: ss a n d  
'ge t t i n g a l o n g '  in ( \  !l1arKe t  economy. " ) .  
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position, in Holmes' famous phrase , to let the "loss from accident lie 
where it falls .  " n2 
For over a century, therefore, courts have wrestled with the notion 
of assumed risk,  sometimes emphasizing that individuals who k now­
ingly take chances are liable for the cost of their injuries ,  and other 
times displaying an unwillingness to absolve defendants of responsibil­
ity for plaintiffs ' injuries. During most of that period, defendants 
could extinguish poten tial liability by presenting convincing evidence 
that a plaintiff's careless conduct contributed to the inj uries .  In the 
many accidents in which both parties were careless .  therefore , the bur­
den was borne exclusively by the injured plaint iff, and the defendant 
had no li ability for the harm . Kn own as con tributory negl igence, this 
doctrine represented a formidable bar to recovery.6C1 Since the 1960s , 
the absolutism of contributory negligence has given way to a sys tem of 
comparative negligence , which emphasizes the re la tive degrees of 
fault borne by each party.04 Although these rules vary by state, in 
almost every instance a plaintiff who can establish that she was less at 
fault than the defendant can recover, with recovery me asured by the 
defendant's degree of fault. For example, a defendant who was 75 % 
responsible for the  accident \;vill pay 7SCYo of the damages. 
The doctrines of contributory and comparat ive negligence are 
closely related to the assumption of risk doctrine. Under the assump­
tion of risk doctrine , a defendant would escape lia bility after proving 
that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of the defendant's negligence. 
Similarly, under a contributory negligence scheme , a defendant would 
also escape liability after convincing the court that the plaintiff had 
acted carelessly . B oth contributory negligence and the assumption of 
ri sk doctrine ,  therefore , incorporated the classic all-or-nothing reason­
ing of the common law. Nloreover, as the black -and-vv'hite reasoning 
of contributory negligence has yielded to the more nuanced analysis 
of comparative fault ,  states with comparative fault statutes have had 
to reassess the assumption of risk defense in many types of claims. 
62.  OLl Y E R  WENDELL HOUvl c;, J R  . .  THE CO �'I i'vJON LA\V 94 ( l im l ) : cf  Schuck.  supra n o te 1 4 . 
at 902 ("'The doctrine of i n formed consent in healthcare shared in the more general expansion of 
American tort l iability that proceeded wel l  into the I ':>80 ·s  and th a t  novi appears to have 
stabil ized "· ) .  
63.  See B LAO:'S LAW DWI J ON A R Y  353 ( 8 th cd .  20(4) ( d e fining contr ibutory negligence as  
" [tlhe principle that  completelv bars a p laintiffs recovery i f  the damage suffered i s  partly the 
p l a i n t i ffs own fault " and noting that  · · lmJost s tates  have abol ished this  doctrine and h ave 
adopted i nstead a comparative-negl i gence scheme " ) . 
64, It!. elt 30n (d efining comparative negl igence as " [ t ]he  p r i nc i pl e t lwt reduces a plain t i ffs 
recovery proportionally t o  the pla i n t i ff's degree of fa ult  in causing t h e  d a m age. ra ther than bar­
rin g recovery completely" anci n o t ing that "I m ]ost  sta tes have s t a tutori lv aciopted the compara­
tive-n egLigence doctri n e " ) .  
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B. The Assumption of Risk Docrtine in Contemporar.v Tort Law 
To better understand the link between comparative fault and as­
sumption of risk, it is essential to recognize that courts have identified 
three types of cases in which risks may be assumed. One involves the 
express assumption of risk,  in which, for example , the skier signs a 
liability waiver whereby the skier agrees to accept the risks of skiing 
and releases a l l  possible defendants from liability for her potential in­
juries .65 Express assumption of risk cases may also involve the fine 
print on the back of a stadium ticket ,  parking ticket ,  ski l ift ticket ,  or 
the agreement one signs when joining a health club. The question 
raised by such cases is whether express agreements should be en­
forced or whether the unequal  b argaining power of the parties negates 
the plaintiff's consent, regardless of the plaintiffs awaren ess of certain 
dangers and apparent choice to confront themY" Cases involving acci­
dents on the s lopes have been treated inconsistently by the courts , 
with some invalidating express agreements on so-called public policy 
grounds ,67 and others finding that the agreements are enforceable .oK 
In the second type of assumption of risk case-primary impJied as­
sumption of risk-the plaintiff's consent is implied rather than ex­
pliciL69 The implied assumption of risk cases focus on the relat ionship 
between the parties and the behavior and knowledge of the plaintiffs. 
Industrial workers, for example, may have taci tly consented to dan­
gerous working conditions and even to the negligence of their employ­
ers ,  and on that basis their claims for compensation may be denied. 
Likewise, spectators at sporting events may choose a seat in a part of 
the stadium that is not protected by screens, thereby exposing them-
6 S .  See, e.g . . Dal ury v .  S - K- 1 .  L t d  . .  6 7 D  A.2d 795. 796 ( Vt .  I YY5 ) ( ho l ding t h a t  l iabi l i tv  waivers 
that  " r e leas[e] defendants  from a l l  l iabi l i ty resul t ing from ncgl igence. are void as contrary to 
public policy" ) .  
6 6 .  See Schuck. Slipra note l 4 .  a t  Y LO. 
Legis latures  often prohibit a n d  courts o ften inva l i d a te [express agreem en ts] as a ma tter  
of public policy. St igmatizing this type of waiver as a con tract of :.1dhesion.  thev e m p h a­
size the consumer's lack of barga i n i n g  power. al ternat ives, risk i n format ion.  anel aware­
ness of the waiver-in esscnce. her l ack of informed con sen t to the risk.  
67.  See, e.g. . Datury. 670 A.2d a t  796. 
68.  See. e. g . . Allan v. Snow S u m m i t .  Inc . .  59 Cal .  Rptr. 2c1 8 1 3 , B I.7 (Cal .  Ct .  App. 1 9% )  ( a f­
firming summary judgment for the d e fendant  ski  area in an act ion hrought by the p l a i n t i ff for 
i njuries suffered while in s k i  school because " i n  considerat ion for being al lowed to enroll  in the 
ski school. [the p l a i ntiff] specifical lv agreed to release Snow Summit  and its employees from any 
liabi l i ty  for i njuries caused by part icipat ing in the ski lesson " ) .  
69 .  See. e.g . . D a n i e l  E. Wan a t .  Torrs and S{!or/illg EI·enr.l: Specillwr lInil PartieipulII  III/li ril'.l"­
UsilIg Defmdan!"s DUly /() Lilllil Lia/J itill' A s  un A l£ernalivl! 10 ,lie Defense of Prill/i l ly tIl1IJ/ier/ 
ASS{{11IPliOl1 of Risk. 3 1  U. MErvl. L. R E V .  237 (20(H ) .  
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selves to errant ballsJo These cases generally focus on "defi ning the 
contours of the legal duty that a given class of defendants . . .  owed to 
an injured p laintiff. "7 !  In cases where no duty is owed by the defen­
dant,  courts often conclude that the pla intiff assumed the risk. 
The third type of assumption of risk case, the secondary implied 
assumption of risk, involves cases in which the defendant breached a 
legal duty and the plaintiff knowingly consented to the risks created 
by the defendant ' s  conductJ2 In the era before the adoption of com­
parative fault ,  there was little reason to distinguish between primary 
and secondary implied assumption of risk because plaintiffs were 
barred from recovery in both types of cases. But with the advent of 
comparative fault , cases of so-called secondary implied assumption of 
risk no longer barred recovery for plaintiffs . Instead, courts began to 
examine whether plaintiffs voluntarily and reasonably took risks that 
were created by defendants' lack of due care , and they then appor­
tioned the loss according to what they considered to be the relative 
responsibil ity of the parties .  
All three types of  assumed risk cases-express, primary implied, 
and secondary implied-are at play in claims that result from skiing 
accidents. These cases quickly make clear that the categorical divi­
sions are muddier in practice than they may appear when viewed in 
abstraction .n In many respects, express assumption of risk cases are 
more about contract law than tort law.74 But in certain circumstances, 
70.  The pri mary impl ied assumption of  r isk  doctrine has been the s ubject of  conside rable 
academic comme n t a ry. Fo r exa mpl e . Steven Sugarman argues that it i s  more doctrina l ly coher­
ent to treat such cases as involving basic questi on s of duty and breach than  to consider t h e m  
under the assumed risk rubric. See Sugarman. supra note 3. a t 1)3(i ( " Many cases i n  wh ich the 
courts talk about ' assumption o f  ris k '  are best  understood as ones in  which t here simply has been 
no negl igence . or more precisely.  'no breach '  of the duty to  exercise due cme . " ) .  I n  Sugarman's 
view. l i ab i l i ty  i n  a case i nvolv i ng a sports spectator should h inge o n  the quest ion of whether t he 
stadium owner had a duty to the spectator. and if so whether the duty was breached.  In the  
absence o f  a duty or the  breach of a du ty t here i s  n o  l iabi l i ty .  The result-no l iab i li ty-is ident i ­
cal to the o n e  that  w o u l d  be reached by concluding that  the plaint i ff had assumed the risk bv 
selecting an unpro tected s tadium seat .  But  the focus of lhe an alysis s h i ft s  from the beh a v ior of 
the plain tiff to the behavior of the defendant. and thus enables courts to avo id the l anguage of 
assumed r isk .  See Sugarman. slipra no t e 3. at  836--37. 
7 1 .  Knigh t  v. Jewe t t .  S34 P.2d (i96. 700 (Cal .  1 9s>2) .  
72. See. e.g . . D aven port v. Cotton Hope Plantat ion Horizontal  Properly Regi me . .:'iO'" S . E.2c1 
56.:'i. 5 7 1  ( S . c .  1(98) ( " Secondarv impl ied assumption of risk. on the ot he r hanet. ar ises when t he 
plai n t iff k n owingly encounters a risk created by the de fe ndan t 's negligence . " ) .  
73 .  Judge Richard Cardamone accuralely described h o w  cour ts  h ave s truggled wit h  l h e  "vex­
i ng phrase 'a ssumption of the risk . . .  · ca l l ing it a " legal maze." D illworth v. Gam bardel la .  970 
F.2d 1 1 1 3. 1 1 1 4- 1 5  ( 2d Cir. 1 (92 ) .  
74.  Many s ta t e courts d isfavor exculpa tory agreements.  See, e .g . .  Dalury v. S-K-L Ltd . . (i7() 
A.2d 795 . 796 (Vt .  1 9l)5 )  (holding that  l iabi l i ty wa ive rs tha t  "re leas[e] defendants  from a l i l iabi l ­
i ty  from negl igence. are voici as contrary to publ ic pol icy " ) .  -nle Colorado Supreme Court ho lds 
that "pare n t a l  indemni ty provision s.  l iab i l i ty waivers that rarents si gn o n  be ha l f  of t h e i r  minor 
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courts that hear a claim about an expressly assumed skiing risk use the 
case as  an opportunity to explore the idea of the assumption of risk 
more broadly. It  is these cases to which we pay careful attention. Fre­
quently, courts do not precisely distinguish between primary and sec­
ondary implied assumption of riskJ5 B oth risks are closely tied to 
what courts and legislatures deem "inherent" risks-the idea that par­
t icipants in sports consent to the risks inherent in a particular sport. 
like horseback riders who consent to the possibility of being thrown 
off their horses, and skiers who consent to the possibility of hitting an 
icy patch or a mogul. Many courts use the language of inherent risk as 
a way of discussing and contextualizing the doctrine of assumption of 
risk .  For example, if a plaintiffs injury results from a risk inherent to 
the sport of skiing, she is said to have assumed the risk . The idea of 
inherent risks is contested, in part because the concept is not self-de­
fining. In some cases, inherent risks are defined as those that cannot 
be removed by due care ,76 whereas in other cases, courts imply that 
even some risks that could be relatively easily remedied are inherent 
in skiing.77 
In examining cases from Vermont, Colorado, and California .  we will 
use the phrase "assumption of risk " or " inherent risk"  as these 
phrases are used by attorneys and courts: to capture the idea tha t  l ia­
bility, at least in part ,  depends upon whether a plaintiff knowingly and 
voluntari ly confronted a risk and upon the nature of the risk that was 
confronted. Throughout the Article, we invoke the phrases "assump­
tion of risk" and " inherent risk"  not because we are unaware of the 
academic debate about their logical and doctrinal  coherence but be­
cause we consider those debates to be less important than the polit ical 
and economic dimensions of conflicts that revolve around actions of 
risk-bearing individuals. As disputes over ski-related accidents make 
clear, state courts, judges, juries,  state lawmakers, and lobbyists con­
tinue to use assumption of risk language to frame the analysis of acci ­
dents that result from risky activities in which a plaintiff wil l ingly, 
perhaps enthusiastically, took part. Doctrinal  coherence-or lack 
chi ldren. violate Colorado's public policy to protect m inors and create an unacceptable con nict 
of in terest between a minor and h is parent or guardian ." Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co . . 4X P..3c1 
1 229. 1 237 ( Colo. 20(2 ) .  
75. See, e.g . . Monk v .  V . 1 .  Water & Power Au th . .  5 3  F.3d 1 3 :-; 1 .  1 3:-;S n.n ( 3d Cir. 1 9(5 ) ( " Ex­
press assumption o f  risk.  as dist i nguished from impl ied assumption of risk.  h a s  retained its viabi l ­
ity as an absolute defense despite the advent o f  comparative negligence . " ) .  
76. See Brett  v .  Great Am. Recreation. I n c  . .  677 A.2d 70S. 7 1 5  ( N .J .  1 9% )  ( " I n  t h e  ski ing 
context. a n  i nherent risk is one that  cannot be re moved t h rough the exercise of due cal c if  the 
sport i s  to be e n j oyed . " ) .  
77. 5ee Souza v .  Squaw Va l ley S k i  Corp . . 4 1  Cal. R p t r .  3 d  3:'-;9. 3l)4 ( Ca l .  C t .  A pp .  2()( )6 ) ( hold­
ing that a collision with a pla inly visi ble hydrant was an i n h eren t  risk of the sport ) .  
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thereof-has taken a back seat, as parties have engaged in  a highly 
politicized struggle over the apportionment of l iability for accidents 
on the slopes. 
C. Assuming the Risk of Inju ry on the Slopes 
The modern era of personal  i nj my l itigation entered the world of 
skiing with a dull thud. Descending a trail in the Green Mountains, a 
skier hit a snow-covered tree stump and broke her legJ8 A United 
States federal district court in the state of Vermont used these quotid­
ian facts as an opportunity to articulate a general standard of l iability 
for ski accidents . In the 1 95 1  case of vVright v. iV]ount Mansjield Lift, 
Inc. , the court held that a skier accepts those "obvious and necessary" 
dangers that " inhere" in the sport of skiing, including falling over a 
natural  obstacle that is hidden under the snow.7l) Showing great defer­
ence to the JI;/llrphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. opinion,80 the 
court wrote,  
TIle doctrine of volenti  non f i t  inj uria  appl ies .  One who takes part  
i n  such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in  i t  so far as  they are 
obvious and necessary . . . .  
. . . Chief Justice Cardozo in the case of [Murphy] discusses the 
law, which I hold to be applicable to ski accident cases . . . . t H  
Then, in  1976, another federal case in Vermont, Leopold v. Okemo 
Jl;Iountain Inc. ,82 strengthened the principle that skiers legally assume 
the risk of being injured on the slopes . �"o In that case, a sk ier who lost 
control, crashed into an unpadded lift tower, and suffered fatal inju­
ries was denied recovery.84 Again ,  the court relied on the principle of 
volenti non fit injuria :  
From h i s  past experience. [the skier] was surely cognizant of  the 
dangers inherent in ski ing a trai l  of th is type . . . .  If he  believed that 
the trail or the towers presen ted risks which were too great ,  h e  
could have chosen not to proceed .  Yet .  he chose to ski the trai l  . . . .  
As he proceeded . [the p laintiff] wi l l ingly assumed a l l  the obviolls 
and necessary risks involved in this descent, including the danger 
that he m ight coll ide with a tower if he lost his control or concentra­
tion for an instant . 85 
7R. Wright v. Mount Mansfield Lift. Inc . .  t)6 F. Supp. 7�6. 79 1 ( D . Vt. 1951 ) .  
79 .  Id. 
SO. Sl:'e .I/1pra notes 52-56 aJld accompanying text .  
81 . Wright. 96 F. Supp. at 791 .  For a discllssion of MllIph v.  see slipra Part II .  
82. 420 F .  Supp. 7K 1 ( D .  Vt .  1976) .  
1>3 .  See Sanders & Gayner. slipm note 34. a t  UO. 
1>4. See Leopold, c12() F. Supp.  a t  781'. 
1>5. lei. at 7'67. 
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Although Vermont 's  1 970 comparative negligence statute enabled 
the court to  apportion responsibility for the accident to both the plain­
tiff and the defendant, the court instead imposed the ful l  cost of the 
accident on the plaintiff, emphasizing that the plaintiff must have 
made a " logical . . .  choice as to whether he should proceed and as­
sume the consequences of skiing in an area where a plainly apparent 
and necessary danger exists . "86 With Wright on the books , it appeared 
that the owners and operators of ski resorts had little to fear from 
courts.S7 
Yet the historical narrative of ski liability had already started to 
change . On February 10 ,  1 974, a twenty-one-year-old beginner skier 
named James Sunday was skiing at a "speed equal to a fast walk" 
when "his ski became entangled in a small bush . . .  concealed by loose 
snow. "S8 He fell off the edge of the traiL struck a boulder, and was 
rendered a quadriplegic.s9 A jury awarded $ 1 .5 million in damages to 
Sunday. In June 1 978 ,  the Vermont Supreme Court rejected not only 
the defendant's appeal, but also the applicability of !vlurphy and 
Wright to the case.90 " [T]he timorous no longer need stay at home," 
the judge wrote in an impassioned opinionY l To the contrary, 
There is concerted effort to at tract their patronage and to provide 
novice trai ls suitable for their use . . . .  [N ]one of [ the evidence] was 
calculated to show the brush to be a danger inherent in the use of a 
novice slope as l a id out and maintained by the defendantY2 
According to the court , because the defendant ski area was aware of 
the underbrush, it "had an absolute duty to properly maintain its nov­
ice slopes free of known hidden dangers. "93 
Insurers and ski mountain owners and operators reacted to the Sun ­
day decision with " unmitigated panic ," predicting that " an avalanche 
of undefendable lawsuits" would quickly follow.'N One commentator 
hyperbolically declared that " [i ]n some jurisdictions, it appears that 
ski accident plaintiffs have an almost automatic right of recovery, "  
and he warned that " [t ]he few who assume the risk of [skiing] without 
seeking redress in the law have vanished l ike the Pteranodon. "95 In-
86. !d a t  787 n.2.  
87. See Sanders & Gayner. slIpra n o t e  34. a t  130. 
88. Sunday v. S t r a t ton Corp . . 390 A.2e1 390. 40 1 (VI .  1 978 ) .  
8<). Id. a t  400-0 l .  
<)0. JrI. a t  402. 
9 1 .  !d. 
<)2. Jd. 
93.  Sanelers & Gayner.  slIpra note 34. at 1 3 1  (citing Sill /do." .  390 A.2e1 at 4(l2 ) .  
9 4 .  !d .  (citing Clarence E .  Hagglund. Ski L ia/Jilily. 32 FED'N [ l" '; .  C U l  ! N S .  Q. 2 2 3  ( 1 91\2 » . 
95.  Hagglund. supra note <)4. at 223 . " Ptera norJon" is part of the Pterosaurial  order of extin ct 
repti les.  
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surance rates dramatically increased, sometimes three-fold , through­
out the  United States, and the  price of lift tickets skyrocketed.96 
Leonard H.  Collier , then-vice president of American Internation al 
Group, Inc. ,  whose American Home Assurance Company subsid iary 
was one of the two major ski-area liability insurers ,97 predicted to the 
�Va!l Street Journal that the Sunday decision "could be catastrophic for 
the ski industry. "98 The insurance industry's acute reaction to the 
Sunday decision was due to several factors : ( 1 )  irritation regarding the 
questionable facts of  the Sunday case , namely, that the plaintiff was 
drunk and had lied about the circumstances of the accident ;99 (2)  dis­
appointment at the size of the award , which was $250,000 more than 
the plaintiff had asked for; and (3)  the belief that the Vermont Su­
preme Court had turned its back on earlier assumed risk holdings that  
had been advantageous for industry for over a quarter of  a century. 1 00 
vVhatever the underlying cause of the industry 's reaction, lO l  the 
consequences were immediately clear: with only two major insurers 
willing to provide coverage to the industry , l02 ski mountain owners 
and operators were stuck with higher premiums, the cost of which 
they passed on to visiting skiers and snowboarders. As skiing became 
more expensive , ski industry analysts estimated that business would 
decrease by as much as twenty-five percent, forcing many small re­
sorts to close . l o3 In a state like Vermont, that could mean losing as 
much as $150 million annually. l o4 In fact, after Sunday's victory in 
trial court , four small Vermont ski areas closed, allegedly because of 
96. S('(' John E .  Fagan. Ski A rm LiahililY for DOWllhill Injuries. 49 INS. COUNS. J . ,  Jan. 1982. a t  
36. -12 (1982).  
97. N e il Ulm:m. Shaken U S. Ski IndllSlry A Wl/irs Verdicr Oil  Respollsih i/iry for Downhill Acci­
dellis. WALL ST. 1 . . Dec. 9. 1977.  at 20. TIle other major ski area l iability insurer was Lloyds. the 
Lon don insurance exchange. Id. 
90. fd. 
l)l) . . .  According to one report. shortly a fter the lower court rendered i ts  decision. a physician 
c l a i med that Sunday had been i ntoxicated a t  the time of the accident and had admitted he did 
not encounter any bush on the trail ." See Wendy A. Farber. Commen t .  Uwh's Inherent Risks of 
Skiing A ct: A I 'a/lll/che limll CopilOt Hiff. 1980 UTAH L. REV.  355. 360 n .33 .  
WO.  111e belief that  the SUI/dov court had rejected Wright is misguided. a s  the c o u r t  in Sun day 
distinguished Wrigh r from the case at hand. " [T]he o n ly difference be tween vVrighr and Sunday 
i s  in t h e ir results. not in the principles of controlling law. In lVriglil. the defendant did n o t  
breach a n y  d u t y  i t  olVed to plaint iff: in Sunday. i t  d i d . "  See Estate of Frant y .  Haystack Group. 
I nc. .  0-1 I A.2d 765. 769 ( VI. 1 994) ( q uoting Dillworth v. Gambardella. 970 F.2d 1 I l 3.  1 1 1 9 (2d 
Cir. ) l)92 ) ) .  
) ( ) l .  O f  course. i t  i s  also possible t h a t  the nature o f  t h e  insurance business leads insure rs t o  
\)\ 'Crel11phasizc certain l iabi l i ty risks in an effort t o  justify significa nt  rate increases. 
1 02 .  See Ulman.  sl ipra note 97. 
1 03.  Fagan. Slipi'll note 96. at -12. 
l ( )-� .  lei. 
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the "insurance squeeze . " I 05 One of them, Little Underhill Ski B owl, 
shut down mid-season when its insurance premiums tripled. IOn Jack 
Murphy, then-general manager of Sugarbush Mountain , explained 
that while his mountain remained open for the time being, his l iability 
premiums had "just about doubled. " l o7 Similarly, Joseph Kohler, 
then-president of B ristol Mountain in Rochester, New York, lamented 
that ., ' [e ] leven cents out of every ticket dollar we took in l ast year 
went across the ocean to Lloyds '  for l iability insurance . . . . That 
compares with about two cents 'a  couple of years ago. '  " 1 0):; 'When  the 
co-owner of Li ttle Underhill Ski B owl was asked by the Wall Street 
Journal if she planned to reopen the following ski season, she re­
sponded, . .  It a ll depends . . .  on how the Vermont legislature resolves a 
major question that has focused the attention of ski-area operators 
from Maine to California on the Green Mountain state : vVho is re­
sponsible for downhill skiing accidents '? " I l l':) 
IV. LEG ISLATING THE ASS UMPTION OF RISK: THE NSAA, THE 
INSU RANCE INDUSTRY, AND THE STATES 
Ski area operators , insurance providers, and state tourism bureaus , 
each feeling newly vulnerable to tort claims brought by inj ured skiers, 
turned to legislatures to clarify what constituted the legally assumed 
risk of skiing. On June 30, 1 977 ,  just three weeks after the lower court 
decision in Sunday, the NSAA " circulated a model Ski Area Safety 
and Liabi lity Act to aid state associations in drafting proposed legisla­
tion for their areas. " 1 1 0 According to one NSAA executive , the goal 
of the act was to place " specific prohibitions on passengers and skiers 
[that would] go a long way towards alleviating the strict liability inter­
pretation that is increasingly being adopted by the Courts. " I I I Just 
before the Vermont Supreme Court ' s  ruling in Sunday, the Vermont 
legislature passed a ski safety statute , the first in the United States. It 
states that " a  person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of 
law the dangers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and 
necessary. "  1 1 2 The Vermont Supreme Court 's ruling in the plaintiff' s 
favor sent ski area operators and associations across the country back 
to the drawing board . They took the NSAA draft legislation to their 
I ( )5. Ulman.  silpm note 97. 
I ( lO .  It!. 
I ()7. Id. 
Wi) . 11/. 
I OLJ .  Id. ( i n ternal  q uotat ion marks omitted ) .  
I I O. far hn. Slfpru note 9 9 .  a t  3 5 5  n . 3 .  
1 i 1 .  Id 
i 1 2 . V I .  ST \ I  .", :�", . t i t .  1 2 . � 1037 ( 20()2 ) .  
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state legislatures in an effort to "nullify Sunday 's precedent and re­
establish [ ] the inherent danger law in skiing. " J 1 3  Within a few years, 
most ski states had passed legislation that imposed liability on skiers 
for the assumed risk of skiing, and by 1 990 twenty-four ski states had 
passed "assumption of risk"  ski safety statutes, all of which remain in 
force . l 1 cl Today, " all  but three states with any significant ski  industry 
have adopted a form of ski safety legislation that in some way limits 
the liabil i ty of ski area operators in ski cases ." l l S 
Although the statutes have a common goal, they take somewhat dif­
ferent forms. 1 1 6  Some seek to reaffirm the pre-Sunday standard by 
mandating that  skiers assume all obvious and necessary risks inherent 
in the sport . Vermont 's ski safety law, for example,  reads, "Notwith­
standing the provisions of [Vermont's comparative negl igence statute] , 
a person who t a k e s  part i n  any sport accepts as a matter of law the 
dangers t hat i n here therein insofar as they are obvious and neces­
sary . " 1 1 7 Lest there be any ambiguity about the statute 's intent, the 
legislative history makes clear that its goal is to limit ski area liability 
1 11 order to keep t he industry afloat :  
Since 1 95 1 ,  t h e  l aw rela t ing t o  l i ab i l i t y  o f  operators o f  ski  areas i n  
con n e c t ion w i t h  d o w n h i ll s k i i ng i nj uries has been perce ived t o  be 
governe d  by t h e  doctr ine of vole n t i  n o n  fi t i nj uria as set forth in the 
case of  \\frigh t v .  M t .  M ansfi e l d  Lift , Inc . . . . .  I n  1 977, in  t h e  case of 
S unday v .  S t r a t to n  Corporatio n , the S uperior Court of Chi ttenden 
County . . .  ru led that  the defense of assumption of r isk was i n ap -
propriate . . .  . 
. . . .  It is the purpose of t h i s  act . . .  t o  state t h e  policy of t h e  state 
which gove rn s  the l iabi l i ty of ope rators of ski  areas . . .  by affirming 
the princip l e s  o f  l aw s e t  for th i n  Wrigh t v. M t . Mansfi e l d  Li ft , I n c  .
. . . which establ ished t h a t  there are inherent  dangers to be accepted 
by skiers a s  a matter o f  law. 1 1 S 
Other states have gone a step further than Vermont by specifically 
articulating the inherent risks of skiing and barring recovery for inju­
ries resulting trom such risks. Utah 's  statute, for example, defines the 
inherent risks of skiing to include changing weather conditions, snowy 
or icy conditions, surface or subsurface conditions, variations or steep-
1 1 3 .  James H .  C h a l a t .  Ski  La w in t he U n it e d  S tates : A Practical G uide to Ski  Accident Lit iga­
t io n I I  (A pr. 2. 200:" ) ( u npublished manuscript prep a red for 3rd Annual  Conference Recreation 
& Adve n t u re Progra lll Law & Liabi l i ty. o n  file with DePaul Lil l I "  Revie w )  (cit ing Farber. supra 
note l)9. at 3.'i:" n.3 ( l l)S( ) ) ) .  
1 1 -1 . S ,mLie r;; & GilVI1 Cr. supra norc 34. a t  1 3 1 -32.  
1 1 5 .  ChalaL S! lpnt note 1 1 3 .  at I I . 
J 1 6 . Much u l' t h i �  c l <lssification is t a k e n  from an incisive discllssion of ski safety statu tes by 
Sanders & G 'l :, n c r. sl/flm iwk 3-1 .  at 1 3 2 .  
1 1 7 .  V I . ST. \!. A N :< .  l i t .  1 2 . � 1 ( )37 (20()2 ) .  
l i S .  fI!. ( Lci!isLit i\'c l i l k n t ) ( q uoting 1 977 .  No. 1 1 9 (Adj . Sess . .  S 2 )  
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ness in terrain ,  impact with l ift towers, collisions with other skiers, 
participation in competitions or special events, and the failure of a 
skier to ski within the skier's own ability . 1 1 9  It goes on to state that 
"no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area 
operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of ski­
ing. " 1 20 Like Vermont's law, Utah 's statute is accompanied by a state­
ment of legislative intent that discusses the critical role that skiing has 
played in Utah's economy, notes the need to maintain reasonable in­
surance rates ,  and highlights the need to limit ski area operators' 
liability: 
�rn e Legis latur e  finds that the sport of skiing . . .  significantly con­
tribut [es]  to the economy of this state .  It  further finds that few in­
surance companies are 'vv i l l ing to provide l iabi li ty i nsurance 
protection to ski area operators and that  the premiums charged by 
those carriers have risen sharply in recent  ye ars cl ue to confusion as 
to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the  sport of ski ing. 
I t is  the purpose of this act ,  therefore , . . .  to estab l ish as a matter of 
law that  certain risks are inherent  in that sport, ancl to provide that ,  
as a matter of publ ic  pol icy,  no person engaged in that sport shal l  
recover from a ski  opera t or for injuries resul ting fro m  those inher­
en t  r isksY2 1 
A third approach to legislating the assumption of risk, exemplified 
by New York 1 22 and Colorado , 1 2.1 identifies both the duties of ski area 
operators and the duties of skiers. For example , Colorado's ski safety 
statute requires ski area operators to post a series of signs and notices 
with "concise , simple ,  and pertinent information," including the de­
gree of difficulty of a ce rtain trail, warnings of extreme or dangerous 
terrain , and notices of any man-made structures t hat are not clearly 
visible to skiers. 1 2-1 Likewise , the Colorado lavv states that , , [  e ] ach 
skier expressly accepts and assumes the risk of and all legal responsi­
bility for any injury to person or property resulting from any of the 
inheren t  dangers and risks of ski ing. " 1 2'i 
Although almost every ski state has a ski safety statute ,  California ,  
despite its substantial ski industry, never adopted a ski  safety statute. 
Instead ,  with the help of an aggressive litigation strategy by plaintiff 
lawyers and defense attorneys , California courts have crafted an ap­
proach to the assumption of risk doctrine that is based solely on the 
1 1 9. U L \I-/ CODE ANN. � 7KB-4-402 ( 20m». 
1 20. Id � 78B-4-403. 
1 2 1 .  ft!. � 7 8 B ·-�-40 I .  
1 22.  See N.Y.  Ll. B .  LAW �� 865-6K (i\!lcKinney 2(J02 ) .  
1 23 .  Cn u l .  R I.:\ ' .  S IXI. �� 33-44- [ ( ) 1  to :13··"�4- 1 1 4 ( 200K) .  
J 24. frl. � �  33 -�4- ] ( )6. 107 . 
1 25 .  [r/. Ii =;:)-4-�- i ( )<). 
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common law. 1 26 Yet, like in other states with ski safety statutes, the 
California courts have also been influenced by elected officials. 
Judges in California have also looked to the legislative codification of 
assumed risk in other jurisdictions, particularly Michigan, when decid­
ing cases involving injuries on the slopes . 1 27 
V .  FROM SE RVICE ROADS TO BURIED ROCKS : SKI ACCIDENT 
LITI GATION IN COLORADO, VERMONT, AND CALIFORNIA 
In the aftermath of the Sunday decision and the ensuing codifica­
tion of assumed risk , disgruntled plaintiffs ' lawyers attacked the ski 
safety statutes as nothing more than "non-duty, special interest, im­
munity legislation. " ! 28 Ski industry representatives countered, 
describing the statutes as simply " codifying the share r d ]  responsibili­
ties of the ski area and the skier" that had always existed in the com­
mon law. 1 29 The industry maintained that by more clearly defining 
the duties of skiers, the statutes provide incentives to be more safety­
conscious, thereby benefiting all parties. "For a long time, we tried to 
play down the risks because we thought we were discouraging entry 
into the sport , "  explained Joseph Kohler, president of B ristol Moun­
tain, " [b Jut now the [NSAAJ has created a skiers' responsibility code 
[along with its ski safety statute] . " 1 30 The owner of Copper Mountain 
in Colorado made a similar claim: with the ski safety statutes re­
minding them that they cannot bring suit for inherent dangers, skiers 
will realize that "it pays to be in good condition and to ski 
carefully. " 1 3 1 
Although lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants vehemently 
disagreed about the merits of ski safety statutes, they shared a funda­
mental assumption: the statutes had successfully codified the assump­
tion of risk,  marking the end of an era of awards like those in Sunday . 
Like the lawmakers who had crafted the statutes, attorneys-as well 
as resort owners and operators-expected the ski statutes to enable 
defendants to prevail in trial court, either through motions for sum­
mary judgment or motions to dismiss. In fact, so-called ski safety leg­
islation appeared to have so fundamentally altered the liability 
landscape that injured skiers had little motivation to sue, and tort law­
yers who use contingency fee agreements lack a compell ing financial 
1 26 .  Te lephone in terview with John E .  Fagan, Partn er. Duane Morris. LLP (June 6. 20(8) .  
1 27.  See in /i'u Part I V.C.  
J 28 .  Chalat .  .1'11/11"<1 note 1 1 3. a1  I I . 
1 2l).  Fagan, slIpra note Sin. at -12. 
1 3( ) .  Ulman . .'"lIpm note l)7 ( i nternal  q uotation marks omit ted) .  
L' 1 .  frl. 
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incentive to come to their aid. In the months following the passage of 
the statutes, ebullient insurers and ski area operators seemed justifia­
bly confident that the new statutes would keep them out of court . 1 32 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the operationalization of the assumption 
of risk statutes became considerably more complex than the parties 
predicted. Most importantly, expectations of protection for the indus­
try l 33 have proven to be unfounded. With each new case brought 
against a ski area, j udges and juries have engaged in a spirited debate 
about the facts of each particular accident to determine whether the 
risk was assumed by the individual skier . 1 34 At the same time, courts 
criticized legislative efforts to immunize ski areas, with judges clearly 
voicing their resentment  against legislation that ignored the distinctive 
facts of individual lawsuits in order to provide immunity for ski ar­
eas .us The result is a rich, passionate, and highly varied collection of 
conflicts in which parties-who debate the appropriate a llocation of 
responsibil i ty for injuries suffered by skiers-clash over competing 
conceptions of assumed risk . 1 36 Critically, as the fol lowing case analy­
sis reveals, there are clear differences between the approaches of the 
courts in Vermont, Colorado, and California . In Vermont ,  which de­
nied recovery to skiers for decades and then changed course in Sun­
day , the courts occupy a middle ground, frequently imposing liability 
on plaintiffs but on occasion a llowing them to recover. 1 37 Courts in 
Colorado have moved from a posture that initially appeared to greatly 
favor plaintiffs to one that is generally favorable to defendants. Cali­
fornia. which lacks a codified assumption of risk ski statue, has been 
decidedly hostile to p laintiffs , embracing a l iability regime that most 
closely approximates the type sought by defendant-friendly parties 
who aggressively and successfully influenced legislation e lsewhere . 
A.  Vermont 
Even before the Supreme Court of Vermont issued its Opll11On in 
Sunday,  the Vermont legislature passed the first ski safety statute in 
132 .  Te lephone i n terVIew with John E. Fagan. Partn er. Duane Morris. LLP (May 5. 2008). 
1 33 .  Sa nders & Gayner. sup/'{{ note 34 . at 134-35 (describing how the ski industry be lieves i t  
has been "able t o  protect i tse l f  wi th a successful effort. l e d  by i t s  own attorneys. t o  have equita­
blv protective legislation enacted th roughout the country " ) .  
1 34. See in/i'lf Part IV.D.  
1 3 5 .  See. e.g . . Estatc� o f  Fran t  v .  Haystack G roup Inc . . ().:l l  A.2d 765 .  771  (Vt. 19(4 ) (d iscussing 
how. d espite assump tion of  risk legislation in Vermont. " [s]kiers should be deemed to assume 
unly th ose ski ing r isks t h a t  the sk i ing industry is not reason ably required to prevent" ) .  
1 36.  frl. 
1 3 7 .  See i} / ti-" PMt I V . A .  
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the United States . 1 38 Vermont's Sports Injury Statute, which came 
into effect in 1 978, is short and straightforward, stating simply that "a  
person who takes part in  any sport accepts as a matter of  law the  dan­
gers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and necessary . " 139 
In the wake of the trial court 's decision in Sunday , legislators h ad ex­
pressed concern that the only two ski area insurers that operated in 
the state might leave the market, which could cause the collapse of 
Vermont 's ski industry. 1 4o The new law, they hoped, would protect ski 
area owners and operators from being sued, and it would enable them 
to win cases quickly through directed verdicts. 1 4 1  During the three 
decades since the passage of Vermont's Sports Injury Statute , how­
ever, the case law has been inconsistent . 1 42 While the courts in many 
instances have shielded defendants from liability, plaintiffs have re­
covered in some notable cases .  In many of these cases, courts have 
questioned the importance of the Sllnday decision and the legislation 
that it inspired . 1 43 
Decided just before the Sports Injury Statute came into effect , 
Green v. Sherburne CO/po gave the Supreme Court of Vermont an op­
portunity to contain the furor unleashed by Sunday . The case was 
brought on behalf of nine-year-old Brett Green, who skied into an 
unpadded utility pole . 1 44 In its judgment for the defendant, the su­
preme court emphasized that Sun day did not impose on ski area own­
ers or operators a "duty to warn concerning dangers inhering in the 
sport of skiing," nor did it impose a "duty to extinguish such dan­
gers . "  1 45 Seemingly backtracking from its earlier opinion in Sunday , 
the court rehabilitated the views expressed three decades earlier in 
Wright: skiers assume the obvious and necessary risks of skiing. 
There are no published opinions involving ski accidents in Vermont 
during the 1 980s , which may indicate that Green, along with the ski 
1 3 8. For a discussion o f  Sunday. see supra notes 88- 1 09 and accompanying text .  
1 39 .  VI. STAT. ANN.  t i l .  1 2 . § 1037 (2002) .  
1 40. See Dil lworth v. Gambarde l la .  970 F.2d 1 1 1 3.  1 1 1 7  (2d Cir .  1 992) ( ,'Fol lowing [Sundllv ] .  
the two primary ski  area insurers threatened to withclraw from Vermont. . . .  [ancl a 1 groundswell  
bui l t-up to restore the law protecting ski  area operators to that which existed prior to the h olding 
in Sunday . " ) .  
1 4 1 . [d. at 1 1 1 8- 1 9 . 
1 42 .  Compare Green v. Sherburne Corp . . 403 A .2d 278. 279-80 (Vt .  1 979) ( finding an unpad­
ded utility pole to be an inherent risk of  skiing). H'itll Estate of Frant  v .  Haystack Group. Inc . . 
04 1 A.2d 765 . 76(, ( finding that an unpadded wooden ski l i ft post was not an inherent risk of 
skiing and thus a l lowing for the possibil ity of  recove ry). 
143. See Nelson v.  Snowbridge. 8 1 8  F. Supp. 80. 83 ( D .  VI. 1 993 ) (" Al though the Sunda), case 
appears at first glance to depart from the rules of \Vright and /YII. !'V[ollsfield. in fact they di ffer 
only in  resu l t . ' · ) .  
1 44.  Sec Green . 403 A.2cl at 27<,). 
1 .:15. it!. 
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safety statute, suppressed potential claims against the ski industry . It 
is also possible that confl icting interpretations of the Sunday decision 
and the legislative response to that decision created a climate of un­
certainty for all parties and led them to settle rather than rely on the 
courts. 1 46 After thirteen arid years, a coll ision between two skiers at 
Stratton in 1 992 brought attention once again to the allocation of re­
sponsibility for ski-related harm in Vermont . 1 47 And, as in earlier 
opinions, assumption of risk was at the core of the conflict . 
Although Dillworth v.  Gambardella involved a lawsuit brought by 
an expert skier whose leg was broken in a collision with another skier, 
the court 's ruling once again discussed the nature of the risks inherent 
in skiing. 1 40 At the outset of its opinion, the court expressed ambiva­
lence about the idea of assumed risk, noting its "obscure and compli­
cated" nature,  the " distinctly different legal theories to which it 
simultaneously refers, " and the way in which it "bedevils the law be­
cause it is often used to express different and contradictory no­
tions ." 1 49 It  then made two observations that have influenced 
subsequent litigation in Vermont.  First , the court asserted that the 
Vermont Sports Injury Statute does not shield the ski industry from 
liability for personal injuries because saying that skiers assume the in­
herent risks of skiing "as a matter of law" leaves the question of what 
counts as an inherent risk in the hands of the jury . I SO By failing to 
define inherent risks in the statute, it appears that the legislature 
made it extremely difficult for courts to direct verdicts for defendants. 
Second, the court argued that the vehement reaction to Sunday was 
misplaced because "the only difference between Wright and Sunday is 
in their results, not in the principles of controlling law. " l s l In other 
words, according to the court, the law of skiing in Vermont remains as 
stated in Wright-volenti non fit injuria-and neither the Sunday 
holding nor the Vermont legislature significantly altered its approach 
to assumed risk. l s2 
Just one year later, Nelson v. Snowbridge, Inc. underscored the ap­
proach of Dillworth. Joanne Nelson, an expert skier, brought suit 
against Sugarbush Resort after she fe ll on a patch of ice, hit a tree ,  
146.  Unfortunately. w e  have been unable t o  obtain sett lement data that would allow u s  t o  
explore this possibi l i ty .  
1 47. Dil lworth v. Gambardel la .  970 F.2d 1 1 1 3 . 1 1 1 3 (2d Cir. 1 992 ) .  
1 48. Id. at  1 1 1 4-23 
149. Id. at 1 1 1 5. 1 1 1 X . 
I SO. Id. at 1 1 1 9-20. 
15 1 .  Id. at  1 1 1 9 . 
1 52.  Ed at l I t o . 
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and sustained multiple injuries, including a broken collarbone and 
clavicle, a fractured skull, crushed vertebra, and fractured ribs. l s3 
Citing the legislative history that accompanied the Sports Injury 
Statute, the court emphasized that Vermont's legislation affirmed "the 
principles of law set forth in Wright v.  Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. and 
Leopold v .  Okemo Mountain, Inc. , which established that there are 
inherent dangers to be accepted by skiers as a matter of law. " 1 5-1 Like­
wise, the court emphasized that Sunday did not establish a new rule of 
law, but instead differed from cases like 'Wright only in result.J:" s Fo­
cusing on Nelson's accident, the court found the dangers she encoun­
tered both obvious and necessaryy ' 56 In the words of the court, " Ice is 
both an obvious feature of skiing and a necessary one: despite exhaus­
tive grooming efforts, ice still remains evident on at least some portion 
of most ski slopes in the East . . . .  On a double black diamond trai l .  
ice presents special difficulties, of which Nelson was also aware. " I S7 
Unlike the Sunday court, which highlighted what ski area operators 
could do to eliminate risks and dangers to skiers, the Nelson court 
asked whether the danger that the plaintiff encountered was obvious 
and necessary, answered affirmatively, concluded th at the pla intiff 
had thus assumed the risk ,  and found for the defendant .  I 5X 
TIle Supreme Court of Vermont offered a more detailed analysis of 
the Sports Injury Statute in Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc. , 
which involved a ten-year-old boy, Martin Frant ,  who was inj ured 
when he skied into an unpadded wooden post that channeled skiers 
into lift lines. 1 59 The trial court reasoned that Vermont 's  s k i  legisla­
tion prevented recovery "as a matter of law because Frant accepted 
the 'obvious and necessary ' risk posed by the corral post . "  I hO The Su­
preme Court of Vermont disagreed and held that the question of 
whether any given risk is obvious and necessary is a question of fact 
for a jury, not a question of law for a judge. 1 6 1 The fact that the legis­
la ture did not provide examples of " obvious and necessary " risks in­
herent in skiing when it drafted the Sports Injury Statute , according to 
the court , indicates the legislature's acknowledgment of the fluid na-
153 .  Nelson Y .  Snowbriclge. 8 1 8  F .  Supp. 8 0 .  8 1  (D.  V I .  1 993) .  
1 54.  fd. at  82.  (quoting VT. STAT. A N N .  t i l .  12 .  � 1037 (2002» . 
I S S .  ld. a t  I{' .  
1 St).  Id. 
1 5 7 .  Id. 
1 5 8.  IrI. a t  83-84. 
1 5 9.  04 1 A. 2e1 765. 766 ( VI .  ( 994 ).  
1 6( ) .  Id. 
l A ! .  It!. ( s ta l ing tha t what  constitules an "obvious and necessary" r isk is ",1 t h n::shold C]lICsti UIl 
or fact decided by the jury" ) .  
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ture of risks . 1 62 When Wright was decided, the court explained , skiers 
assumed the risk of colliding with snow-covered tree stumps because 
grooming techniques in 1 949 did not enable resort operators to detect 
remove, or warn skiers about such h azards . 1 63 By the time of Frant's 
accident ,  that was no longer the case.  Summarizing its view, the court 
stated, 
We do not  think the l egislature 's purpose in  reasonably p rotecting 
the ski ing industry is compromised by ask ing a j ury to supply a con­
temporary sense of what constitutes an obvious or necessary risk.  
Skiers should be deemed to assume only those skiing risks that the 
skiing i ndustry is not reasonably requ ired to prevent. 1 64 
In essence , the court deftly sidestepped the legislat ion, and reasserted 
the authority of Vermont 's  courts to determine li ability for the h arms 
resulting from skiing. Thanks to the vague l anguage of the statute ,  
two decades after its influential decision in SUl7da}' , and in the shadow 
of state legislation that was clearly meant to limit the liabilitv of ski � " "' 
area owners and operators, the Supreme Court of Vermont has made 
it clear that it will continue to balance the risk-taking behavior of ski ­
ers with the precautions taken by ski areas when apportioning l iability 
for ski accidents. In doing so, it pushed back against the shield of 
liability that the ski industry believed it had obtained through the po­
litical process, and it revitalized the possibility of recovery, at least for 
some injured skiers. 1 65 
l62. frl. at 770 ( "' I n  drafting [the ski safety statute] .  the legislature avoided cata loguing lacl­
specific examples of ' obvious and necessary' risks , , . , [and] th ereby recogn ized . . .  that yester · 
day's necessary skiing risks tend to become, with the passage of t ime and advancement of tech­
nology. reasonably avoidable ," ) .  
163 .  fd 
l64. frl. at 77 1 .  
1 65 ,  In  addition to the implied assumption o f  risk cases in Vermont. one case t h a t  high l ights 
the continuing importance of assumption of risk in the context of  skiing and other dangerous 
activities is Datll!'Y v. 5-K-1, Lid" 670 A .2d 795 ( Vt. 1 995) .  lll is case involved a skil led skier who 
purchased a season pass to the Ki l li ngton Ski Area and signed a form stating that he agreed to 
freely accept and voluntari ly assume the risks of injury or  property damage and re lease 
Ki l l i ngton Ltd .. its employees and agents from any and a l l  l iabi l i ty for personal injury 
or property damage resulting from negligence, conditions of the premises, operations of  
the  sk i  area, actions or  omissions o f  employees or  agents of  t h e  sk i  area or  from my 
participation in skiing at the area, accepting myse lf  the fu ll responsibi l i ty for any anel a l l  
such el amage o r  injury of a n y  kind which may resu l t .  
fd. at 796. To determine t h e  effect of t h i s  waiver. t h e  court looked to t h e  l eading case of lilnkl v. 
Regenls of Unil'e!'.lilv of California, 383 P.2d 44 1 ,  445-46 ( 1 963) .  According to lilllk!. 
An agreement is invalid i f  i t  exhibits some or all of the fo l lowing ch aracteristics: [ I .  l i t 
concerns a business of a type general ly thought suitable for public regul ation. [2.J The 
party seek ing exculpation is e ngaged in performing a service of great i mportance to the 
pub l ic, which is  often a matter of practical necessi ty for some members of the public .  
[3 . ] 1l1e party ho lds [ i t Jself  out as  w i l l ing to perform this service for any member of the 
publ ic who seeks i t .  or at least  for any member com i ng wi thin certain establ ished 51,1 11 -
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B. Colorado 
Colorado judges and the Colorado state legislature have been spar­
ring for three decades over the text of the Colorado Ski Safety Act of 
1979. When setting forth the duties of skiers, the Colorado Act origi­
nally stated that " [e ] ach skier has the duty to maintain control of his 
speed and course at all times when skiing and to maintain a proper 
lookout so as  to be able to avoid other skiers and objects." 1 66 After 
the Act was passed, Colorado judges issued a number of pro-plaintiff 
decisions that were perceived by backers of the legislation as being 
directly at odds with the dictate of the statute . 1 67 In response, the 
legislature and the ski industry reconvened in 1 990 to redraft and 
strengthen the assumption of risk l angu age in the statute. 1 6K The post­
amendment cases demonstrate how the courts have responded to the 
legislature 's  effort to more explicitly address assumption of risk .  
Despite the 1990 statute 's explicit language that skiers assume the 
risks inherent in skiing, Colorado's courts  have remained surprisingly 
sympathetic to those who have suffered ski injuries .  While the n um­
ber of  published ski injury cases is modest, they illustrate a pa ttern: 
courts often deny defendants' motions for summary judgment, even 
when doing so appears to contravene the language of the statute and 
the intent of the legislature. In sixteen out of twenty-eight cases, 
plain tiffs have either recovered damages or at l east defeated summary 
judgment motions, even in cases involving injuries that resulted from 
dards. [4 . ]  As a resul t  of the essential nature of the service. in  the economic set t ing of 
the transaction. the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bar­
gaining strength against  any member of the public who seeks [the party's] services. [5 . ]  
In  exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a stan­
dardized adhesion contract o f  exculpation. and makes no provision whereby a pur­
chaser may pay additional reasonab le fees and obtain protection against n egligence. 
[0.] Final ly.  as a result of the transaction. the person or  property of the purchaser is 
placed under the control of the seller. subiect to the risk of carelessness by the sel ler or 
[ the sel ler's] age n ts_ 
DU/llr),. 670 A.2d at  796 (cit ing Tunk/. 838 P.2d at  44S�46 ) .  
The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that  i t  is  contrary to  public pol icy to enforce a l iability 
waiver that  prevents skiers from bringing claims against ski area owners and operators. In tbe  
court's words. " If defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of the ir  l iabil i ty,  an impor­
tan t  incentive for ski areas to manage risk would be removed with the public bearing the cost of 
the resul ting injuries . "  ld. at 799. In the court 's view. although the statute imposes the inherent 
risks of skiing on skiers. ski areas continue to have a du ty to "warn o f  or correct dangers which in 
the exercise of reasonable prudence in the circumstances could have been foreseen and cor­
rected . "  Id. at 800 (quoting Frail I. 64 1 A.2d at 709). 
USo. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44- 109 ( 2 )  (2008 ) .  
1 07 .  SI!I!. I! .g  . . Phill ips v. Monarch Recreation Corp . .  oh8 F.2d YR2. 984�8o ( Colo.  Ct .  App.  
I LJ83) ( findi ng. despite the passage of the Sk i  Safety Act .  that  the �ki  area should have warned 
the p la in t iff of the risk of his injury ) .  
I (iK. 1 990 Colo.  Sess .  Laws 1540. 
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risks that were likely considered "assumed" at the time the statute was 
enacted .  In reaching those results, judges focused on whether particu­
lar risks were " inherent" to skiing or whether ski areas could have 
eliminated them. 1 69 Frequently, they concluded that the risk could 
have been minimized or eliminated by the ski area. 1 70 Yet the statute 
retains some vitality: when courts find that a skier's injury resulted 
from an inherent risk, the defendant 's summary judgment motion 
prevails. 1 7 1  
In a case decided shortly after the passage of the 1979 Ski Safety 
Act, a skier sued for injuries that he sustained after he collided with a 
trail grooming machine ("sno-cat " ) .  1 72 The Act states that "whenever 
maintenance equipment is being employed to maintain or groom any 
ski slope or trail while such trail is open to the public, a conspicuous 
notice to that effect shall be placed at or near the top of that slope or 
traiL "  1 73 To determine whether the defendant was negligent in failing 
to post signs that warned skiers about the sno-cat ,  the court asked 
whether the risk posed by the sno-cat was inherent to the sport of 
skiing, or whether the ski area could have minimized or eliminated the 
injury. 1 74 It concluded that ski areas can-and should-warn "skiers 
that their path may be obstructed by heavy machinery ."  1 75 
In another case decided the same year, a United States court of 
appeals sitting in Colorado struggled to identify the types of risks to 
be borne by skiers. After a jury returned a verdict for a skier who was 
injured when he hit a rock on a ski slope , 1 70 the defendant appealed, 
arguing that while the Ski Safety Act requires ski areas " to mark man­
made obstacles on slopes that are not clearly visible in conditions of 
ordinary visibility," I 77 it does not require ski areas to mark non-man­
made or natural objects , such as rocks . 1 7K Despite the statute's ex­
plicit language , the court held that in addition to warning skiers of 
man-made obstacles, ski areas should be required "to mark man-made 
obstacles . . .  that are not clearly visible in conditions of ordinary visi-
1 69.  Courts also use terms such as " obvious" and "n ecessary" to describe a risk or danger as 
being " inherent" to  the sport of  ski ing. See. e.g. . Rimk us v .  Nw. Colo. Ski. Corp . .  706 F.2d lO60. 
1063 ( 10 t h  Cir. 1 9S3 ) (descri bing h azarcls that were "obvious" to the skier) .  
1 70. Sec, e.g. . Ph i l lips v. Mona rch Recreation Corp . .  668 P.2d 982. 984 ( Colo.  Ct.  App. 1 983 ) .  
1 7 1 .  See. e.g. . Peck v. Va il Assocs . .  Inc .. No.  94- 1 0 1 5 . 1 995 WL 1 8278. at  *1  ( 1 0t h  Cir.  Jan. I S. 
1 995 ) .  
1 72 .  Phi l l ips v. Monarch Recre a tion Corp . . 668 P.2d 982. 984 ( Colo. Ct .  App. 1 983 ) .  
1 73 .  fd, ( q uoting Cm.o. REV ,  STAT. � .'\3-44- 108 ( 1 973 & Supp. 1 (8 2 » . 
1 74 .  Id. a t  985 . 
175 .  It!. 
1 76. Rimklls. 7UI'i F.2d at  I ( )6 ! .  
1 7 7 .  Id. a t  1067 ( q uoting COLO. RF\· .  S I Ar. � 33 -44- j ( )7(7)  ( 1 97 9 » . 
1 78. Sf'£' Rimklls. 7()6 F.2d at I OA7. 
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bihty." The court thus confirmed the d istrict court 's verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff. 1 7 <) Once again, the court creatively interpreted the Ski  
Safety Act in  an effort to balance a skier's responsibility and a ski 
area's duty to eliminate unsafe conditions. In  doing so, it concluded 
that even certain natural objects could be eliminated with due care 
and were thus not ri sks inherent to skiing. 1 00 
As the years passed, courts continued to e ngage in detailed analyses 
of inherent risks, and those who thought the Ski Safety Act insulated 
the industry from l iability began to vocalize their disappointment. I :-S 1 
Colorado Ski Country USA (CSC) ,  the central lobbying organization 
for Colorado ski areas, criticized the courts for fai l ing to understand 
that the Ski Safety Act granted blanket immunity to ski areas . I :-S2 To 
remedy t he situation , CSC presented the Colorado state legislature 
with a new bi ll and aggressively argued for its passage by noting that 
despite the 1 979 statute , " mult imill ion-dollar judgments against ski re­
sorts [continue to present] an economic burden for the i ndustry. " I K' 
In 1 990, the Colorado legislature amended the Ski Safety Act. U..;-I The 
most significant alteration of the statute was an unequivocal "legisla­
tive declaration" about the assumption of risk : 
111e general assembly . . .  finds that,  despite the passage of the " Sk i  
Safe ty Act o f  1 979 ,"  ski  area operators of this s tate cont inue t o  be 
subjected to claims and l itigation involving accidents which occur 
during the course of ski i ng, which c la ims and li tigation anel threat 
thereof unnecessarily increase Colorado ski area operators' 
costs . . . .  [S]uch increased costs are e1ue ,  in part, to confusion under 
the " Sk i  Safety Act of 1 979" as to wheth er  a skier accepts and as­
sumes the dangers and risks inherent in  the sport of ski ing.  It is t he  
purpose of  this act, therefore, to c larify the  l aw in  relation to ski ing 
inj uries and the dangers and risks inherent  in  that sport, to establ ish 
as a matter of law that certain dangers and risks are inherent in that 
spor t .  <'Ind to provide that,  as a matter of publ ic po licy. no person 
engaged in that  sport shal l  recover fro m  a ski area operator for in ju ­
ries result ing from those i nherent dangers and risks . 1 85 
1 79.  Jd 
I KO. fd. 
1 S t .  S<:'I!. '-'.g . . Pizza v. wol r  Creek Ski Dev. Corp . . 7 1 1  P.2d 67 1 .  683 ( Colo. 1 98 5 )  (discussing 
the s i t ua t ions in w h ich " a  skier can ord inarily guard against  poten t i a l ly dangerous variations in 
terrain" and si t u a t ions i n  w h i c h  skiers are unable to do so. ) .  
l S2 . .lc ffcfY A .  Roberts .  Colo. Ski Indllstry Wins First Leg{{/· Li{{/Jility 8mr/e Firs!. D ENVER 
POST. Jan.  3 1 .  I 99! 1 :  see also John Acco l a .  Ski ReSOri Liahiliry. ROCK Y MOl INTr"\ l i-l NEWS. Jan. 25. 
1 l)90. 
I S3 .  Roher ts .  SlljiW note 1 ",2: St'1! a/so Accola. sllpra note I S2 ( "A 1 982 sk i  acc ide n t in Aspen 
thai resulted in < I  :£7 m i l l ion jury award is  being used by Colorado ski  resort opera tors to draw 
support for a nt:w bill c\t:lll p t ing them from l iab i l i ty for certa i n  ski accidenls . " ) .  
I S-I. I lJl)O Co lo.  Sc :". Laws 1 540. 
I SS .  !J 
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With the amended statute, the Colorado legislature and the ski in­
dustry sent an unambiguous message: courts should carefully  consider 
the consequences of imposing liability on ski area operators in cases 
involving inj ured skiers. And just in case a plaintiff managed to suc­
cessfully navigate the barriers to recovery, the new Act includes a $ 1  
million cap on damages for skiers. 1 86 
Colorado's amended Ski Safety Act caused considerable contro­
versy and debate. Representative Scott McInnis, a Republican cos­
ponsor of the bi l l ,  defended the legislation to the Denver Post: "The 
search for the deep pockets will come to an end with this bi l l  . . . .  This 
is a sport that sometimes has injuries associated with it . . .  [skiers] 
should be careful . · ' 1 87 In response , Representative Steve Ruddick. a 
Democrat who tried unsuccessful ly  to remove the damages cap and to 
add a provision that exempted people under eighteen years of age 
from the law, l oS warned that "if injured skiers are barred from suing 
to recover damages ,  t hey could become dependent on government for 
medical care or other assistance ," and he questioned why " [w]e 've de­
cided that one industry needs charity from taxpayers . "  1 89 The Rocky 
N/ollnt[[in News also weighed in,  publishing a powerful editoria l  in  
support of the bill :  "Skiing is  dangerous . . .  dangerous enough to  
demand special care from those who venture onto the slopes. For 
most of us, of course,  the pleasure of skiing easily outranks the risk . 
But it would be hypocrisy to pretend ,  should our luck run out, that we 
don' t  know the score . " J 90 
The conflict over the Ski Safety Act demonstrates how powerful 
actors have strategically mobilized around the assumption of risk doc­
trine to further their material interests. Unconcerned with the con­
ceptual failings of the doctrine, they exploit its inherent ambiguities in 
an effort to structure judicial outcomes. J 9 J But the Colorado courts 
I;)(). Id. a t  1 543. 
I S7.  Jeffery A. Robe rts. House Supporrs Measure Barring Skiing La lvsuits. DENVER POST. 
Ma 1. 22. 1 990. 
IS;). Id. 
1 89 .  Id. 
l LJO. E dilo ria l .  Skiers Should Assume the Sport 's Inherent Risks. ROCKY MOl J NTA IN NEWS. 
Fe b .  1 .  1 990. al 5R: ({ccurd Joe Garnt!L Lowered Liability Fails to Freeze Ski-Liti Prices. ROCK't 
MOl iNTr\ I N  N lOWS. Ju ly 20. 1 990. at l () ( discussing the lack o f  a correspond ing declint! in t he price 
of l i ft - l icke ts) :  Editori aL Suing fo r Fun and Profit: Risky Business in Ski Country, ROCKY MOllN-
1 . \ 1 "1 N E WS.  1\,1a), 4. 1 990. al 78 ( a rguing that the ski  l iability bill  re presen ts a stand against  frivo­
iU LIs la wsui t s ) .  
1 9 ! .  P:lrtic:s  on a l l  sides of t h e  issue undertook stra tegic mobil ization i n  an effort to secure a 
fa vorable l e g a l  doctrine,  See John Sanki  & John Accola .  Ski (I{ Own Risk, Say LIl I I 'l Iwkers; 
HI!IISIIFC WO llld L imit L il/h ilirv < I ( Resorts. ROCKY MUUNTA IN NEWS. Ja n ,  3 1 . 1 99U: John Accola .  
l{npollSihilill' fin' SO/i'll' De/Jlllui: Skier V.I'. Ski Area . ROCKY MOU :--ITAIN NEWS. Feb.  U .  I 99( ). 
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h ave not been easily contained. Since the 1 990 amendments, courts 
have continued to engage in a dialogue about the assumption of risk 
and the meaning of "inherent risks . " More than half of the fifteen 
published post-amendment cases have been favorable to plaintiffs. I 92 
The impact of the amended Ski  S afety Act on the liability of ski  
resort owners and operators is illustrated by cases such as Peck v .  Vail 
Associates, a 1995 case in which the plaintiff alleged that she suffered 
serious injuries because of the defendant's negligent placement of 
safety cones along the chairlift's exit ramp. I 93 In  keeping with the 
amended statute 's emphasis on barring claims brought by plaintiffs 
who assume the inherent risks of skiing, the court focused its analysis 
on whether the risk that led to Peck 's injury was "inherent , "  as de­
fined in the Act. 1 94 Doing so led the court to conclude that despite 
the fact that she was hurt at the exit of the chair lift, the risk which led 
to her inj ury was " inherent," and thus, no recovery was forthcoming. 
But interpretation of the statue has also gone in the opposite direc­
tion. In Graven v. Vail Associates, an experienced skier fel l  on slushy 
snow and plunged forty to fifty feet into a steep unmarked ravine that 
ran adj acent to the run . 1 95 The skier claimed that his injuries were 
caused by the defendant 's failure to warn him about the ravine. l 96 
The Colorado Supreme Court used the legislative history of the 1 990 
amendments to justify a narrow construction of the phrase "inherent 
dangers and risks of skiing . "  1 97 It noted that the scope of the phrase 
" variations in steepness or terrain" was addressed during hearings 
before the House State Affairs Committee when a ski lobby represen­
tative stated, " [S]kiers encounter terrain changes, a trail turning to the 
right or left, or a trail dipping, and a skier going too fast out of control 
will fall , and instead of looking to himself will sue the ski areas. " 1 9K 
The court distinguished the conditions encountered by the plaintiff 
from those considered by the legislature: 
Skiing is a dangerous sport. Ordinary understanding tells us so, and 
the legis lature has recognized that dangers inhere in  the sport. Not 
a l l  dangers that may be encountered on the ski  slopes ,  however, are 
H a d  t h e  plaint iffs' h a r  been be tter positioned pol it ically i n  Colorado. i t  may have been more 
successful in battling the ski industry. 
1 92 .  Of fifteen published cases since the Act was amended. eight were decided in favor of 
plaint iffs. and seven in favor of defendants. 
1 93 .  Peck v. Va i l  Assocs . .  Inc . .  No. 94- 1 0 1 5 ,  1 995 W L  1 8278. at *1 ( lOth Cir. Jan. 1 8 . 1 995) .  
1 94. Id. 
195 .  9U9 P.2d 5 1 4 . 5 1 5  ( Colo. (995) .  
1 96.  It!. 
1 97 .  It!. at 5 19. 
1 91\. Id. a t  5 l l! ( cit ing Hearings Oil S. B.  80 Be/1m' the H Stale A !lclir.1 C(JI I I /n. ,  57th Gen. As­
sembly. 2e1 Reg. Sess. (Mar. U. 1 990) ( Audio Tape No. 90- 1 1i. » . 
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inherent a n d  integral to the sport, and this determi nation cannot 
always b e  made as a matter of law. In the present case , the p lain tiff 
describes t h e  terrain that precipitated his injuries as a steep ravine 
or precipice immediatel y  next to the ski run. This description con­
jures up an image of a h ighly dangerous situation created b y  locat­
ing a ski run at the very edge of a steep drop-off. If such a 
hazardous situation presents an inherent risk of skiing that need n ot 
be marked as a danger area, the ski area operator's duty to warn . . .  
is essentially meaningless. Therefore , we do not construe [the Act] 
to include such a situation within the inherent dangers and risks of 
skiing as a matter of law . 1 99 
291 
In distinguishing the facts of Graven from the statute's explication 
of " inherent dangers, "  the court engaged in the type of analysis that 
legislators had hoped to rein in with their 1990 amendments. Jim 
Chalat, a prominent plaintiff's attorney in Colorado, describes Graven 
as significant because it enables some skiers to sue operators for inju­
ries that result "not only from a ski area operator's breach of a specific 
duty set out in the Ski Act, but also from a danger or risk which is 
found to be not ' integra l '  to the sport " even though the risk appears to 
be defined as an " inherent" risk by the statute.200 Because Graven 
held that the determination of inherent risks is not always a matter of 
law as determined by the Ski Act, but is sometimes a matter of fact ,2O I 
it gave attorneys like Chalat hope that they might be able to get their 
claims in front of j uries even under the amended Act.202 
Graven's approach to the assumed risk of skiing was strengthened 
three years later in Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc. In Rowan , the survi­
vors of a skier who died after striking a picnic deck brought a wrong­
ful death suit against the ski resort .203 The court recognized that the 
Ski Act bars " any claim against any ski area operator for injury result­
ing from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing, and that the 
statute defines 'inherent risks and dangers of skiing to include impact 
with . . . man-made structures and their components. "204 B ut the 
Graven precedent, the court explained, meant that " the court must 
consider whether dangers and risks 'are an integral part of the sport of 
1 99.  ld. a t  520 (citations omitted) .  
200. Chalat  Hatten Law Offices. P.c..  Ski Areas Are Shaken by Ruling 1l1a t  Unnecessary 
Hazards Are Not I nherent Dangers. ht tp ://www.ski law.com/j imcases-grave n . h t m l  (last visited 
Nov. 1 3 . 2(09 ) .  
201. Gravel l ,  909 P.2d a t  520 ( " [W]e do not  construe section 33-44- 103 ( 3 . 5 )  to include such a 
s ituation with in the inherent  d ange rs a n d  risks of ski ing as a mat ter of law. " ) .  
202. Chalet  Hatten Law Offices. silpra note 200. 
203 . 3 1  F. Supp. 2d 889. 892 ( D. Colo.  1998 ) .  
204. fd. a t  902 ( q uoting C O L O .  REV.  STAT. � �  33-44- 1 1 2 , 103 ( 3 . 5 »  ( emphasis o m i t ted) ( i n te r­
nal  quo tation marks omitted ) .  
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skiing. "'205 The critical question, according to the court, is "whether a 
picnic deck . . .  i s  an integral part of skiing, i. e . , whether the sport 
could not be undertaken without confronting that risk. "206 The court 
compared the picnic table to hydrants, signs, and the other objects 
that are listed as inherent risks in the Ski Act, and it found that the 
picnic table, in contrast to those other objects, is not essential to the 
operation of a ski area.207 Further, the hazard of the picnic deck could 
have been easily eliminated with padding.20R Following that reason­
ing, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary j udg­
ment.20Y Other cases in Colorado have continued to demonstrate the 
willingness of courts to allow plaintiffs to recover for their ski  
injuries.2 l O 
Eleven years after the Colorado state legislature and ski  industry 
lobby collaborated to pass a strengthened l iability shielding s tatute , 
Colorado's courts have continued to engage in a dialogue about the 
assumption of risk  doctrine,  finding i t  questionable whether plaintiff 
skiers assumed certain risks even when the risks are defined as "inher­
ent" under the Ski  Safety Act. After the 1 990 amendments made i t  
clear that the Colorado Ski Safety Act was intended t o  codify the as­
sumption of risk doctrine in order to protect the financial interests of 
the ski indus try, courts have persisted in construing the statute in a 
manner that allows courts to engage in  a detailed analysis of the as­
sumption of risk when allocating l iability for accidental harms on the 
slopes .  
c. C{[liforni{[ 
Unlike Vermont and Colorado, California does not have a ski safe ty  
statute. As a result, California's common law of  torts has  shaped the  
205 . RmFill l .  3 1  F .  Supp. 2 d  a t  l)02 (citat ion omi tted ) .  
20G. Td. at 903 . 
207. Td. 
20c. lei. 
2()9. Iii. 
2 1 0. See, e.g . . Doering v. Copper Moun tain .  Inc . . 259 F.3d 1 202. 1 2 1 3  ( lOth Cir .  20( ) 1 ) ( finding 
that  even p la in t i ffs h armed by inherent dangers may be able to recover) .  [n what i s  now referred 
to as the "Doering Ru le ."  the court s ta ted that the j ury must first i nquirc as to \v hc thcr t ile ski 
area breached a statutory duty before looking into whether an inherent danger was implica ted in 
the plaint i ff's in jury because i f  
Iri. 
a jury were to find tbat Copper Mountain violated [the Act] and these v io lat ions con­
tributed to the in juries, the chi ldren's claims cannot be barred as an inherent danger or 
risk of  sk i ing . 
. . Barring a skier's claim as a n  inherent danger . . .  before determin ing whether a 
ski area operator viola ted [ the Act] renders a sk i  area operator's s ta tu to ry dut ies  
111 e ani n g Ie 5 S .  
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outcome of l itigation over accidents on the slopes. Perhaps surpris­
ingly, in the absence of the codification of assumed risk and without a 
clear statement from the legislature about the importance of shielding 
the ski industry from liability, California courts have been more vigor­
ous in shielding the ski industry from liability than those in either Ver­
mont or Colorado. 
In 1990, for example, an intermediate skier lost control on a slope in 
the San Bernadino Mountains, collided with a tree, and sustained per­
manent brain damage.2 1 1  According to the defendant , the skier, Vicki 
D anieley, had assumed "any and all" risks of skiing, including the "in­
herent, obvious and unavoidable risks of participating in the sport. " 2 1 2 
The challenge, as the court recognized, was to determine \vhether the 
risk was "inherent " or whether the defendant had a duty to warn ski­
ers about the tree or to remove the tree .2 1 3  
The only relevant California precedent was a 1 962 case,  the fi rst 
published California opinion about a ski accident.2 1 -i The court 
deemed that the facts from that case were significantly different. and 
it therefore looked beyond California to see how other states h andled 
cases involving accidents on the slopes.2 1 5 Coincidenta l ly ,  a ] 98R 
lvIichigan case had facts paralleling those of Dan ieley-tbere too a 
skier was badly inj ured after colli ding with a tree-and was resolved 
with reference to Michigan 's Ski Area Safety Act .2 1 6  According to the 
Californ ia court, Mich igan's law " purports to reflect the pre-existing 
common law, [ so] we regard its statutory pronouncements as persua­
sive authority for what the common law in this subject-matte r area 
should be in California . "2 1 7 Central among those pronouncements 
was the Michigan Act's enumeration of the inherent risks of skiing: 
" injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsur­
face snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms 
of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski l ift towers and their 
components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly vis­
ible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. "2 1 8 Interestingly, the 
Danieley court was untroubled by the state-by-state natur e of the 
2 1 1 .  See Danielcy v .  Goldmine Ski Assocs .. 266 Ca l .  Rptr. 74l). 750-5 J (Cal .  Ct .  App. 1 <)l)() ) .  
2 1 2 .  frl. at  75 1 .  755. 
2 1 3 . ld. at  753. 
2 1 4 .  See McDanie l  v.  Dowel l .  26 Cal . Rptr. 1 4( ) .  1 42 ( Cal. Ct.  App. ( 962 ) .  Th e pla in t i lT wa� 
knocked down by another skier whi le  waiting for the towrope to take her to the top of  the 
mounta in .  anc! she brough t a claim against both the skier and the towrope uperator. fd. 
2 J 5 .  Dal l ielev. 260 Cal .  Rptr. at 756 ( " M ich igan is one such state . . . .  " ) .  
2 1 6 . See Schmitz v .  Cannonsb urg Skiing Corp . .  428 N.W.2d 742. 743-44 ( M ich .  Ct .  App.  1 (88 ) 
(c i t ing M IC H .  C01\II'. LAWS � 40:-l.342(2» . 
2 1 7 . Dall iele\ · .  266 Cal .  Rptr. at 756. 
2 1 K . 1\1 1(1 1 .  COi\I f' .  L\ws � 4U�.342(2 ) ( J 902 ) .  
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common law of torts. Opining that the Michigan statute clearly stated 
that the risk of colliding with a tree was inherent to the sport and was 
thus assumed by the plaintiff, the Danieley court upheld summary 
j udgment for the defendant.2 1 9 Since the Danieley holding in 1990, 
California courts have regularly referenced the Michigan legislature 's 
codified definition of inherent risks when deciding the merits of claims 
brought by injured skiers.220 
California ' s  most important case on skiing and the assumption of 
risk doctrine-Knight v. Jewett-involved touch football .22 1  In that 
case a young woman was injured in a collision with another player 
who, she claimed, ignored her request to play less aggressively .222 
Noting that "the assumption of risk doctrine has long caused confu­
sion both in definition and application. "  the court turned to skiing in 
an effort to clarify the doctrine's meaning .n3 In his plurality opinion, 
Justice Ronald George stated that although a slope with moguls is 
more dangerous than one without moguls, " the challenge and risks 
posed by the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort 
has no duty to eliminate them . "22 4 But he made clear that not every 
risk is inherent by stating that ski resort owners and operators 
have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant 
over and above those inherent in the sport . Thus, although a ski  
resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski  run, i t  clearly does 
have a d uty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe ,  work­
ing condition so as not to expose s kiers to an increased risk of harm. 
The cases establish that the latter type of r isk,  posed by a ski resort's 
negligence, clearly is not a risk (i nheren t in the sport) that is  as­
sumed by a participant.22s 
Not all of the justices concurred with Justice George 's view. Justice 
Stanley Mosk, for example, declared that " [t]he time has come to 
eliminate implied assumption of risk. "226 B ut in cases involving in-
2 1 9 . Danieley, 266 Cal. Rptr. at  756-60. 
220. See, e.g .. Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp . . 4 1  Cal .  Rptr.  3d 389. 393 (Cal .  Ct. App.  20(6 ):  
Van Dyke v. S.K.I .  Ltd .. 79 Cal .  Rptr. 2d 775. 770 (Cal .  Ct. App. 1 998) :  Wat tenbarger v .  Cincin­
nati  Reds, Inc . . 33 Cal.  Rptr. 2d 732 . 736 (Cal .  Ct . App. 1994) ( does not involve skiing. but cites 
to the Michigan sta tute); Handelman v. Mammoth Mountain Ski  Area. 1 9  Cal. Rptr.  2d 1 26. 1 3 1  
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (depublished ) .  
22 1 .  See Knight v. Jewett .  834 P.2d 696. 697 ( Cal .  1 992) .  
2 2 2 .  Id. 
223. Id. at 699. 705. 
224. Id. at  708. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 7 1 2  ( Mosk . L concurring in part and d issenting in par t ) .  Justice Mosk later rei ter­
a ted the plea he made in his Knigl71 concurrence in Cheong v. A mahlin. 946 P.2d 8 1 7 . 823 ( Cal .  
1 9( 7 )  ( Mosk. J .. concurring) ( ,, ]  would discard the confusing. and unnecessary. terminology of 
'prin13ry assumption of risk' and analyze the issue as a question of 'duty. " ' ) .  
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jured skiers, California's courts have continued to use the lens of as­
sumed risk, and they have regularly invoked the Knight court 's 
language for the principle that there is a duty to not increase the risks 
of skiing beyond those that are inherent.227 Just two years after 
Knight, a skier was severely injured after he skied into a ravine that 
was filled with boulders, and he brought a cause of action alleging that 
the resort negligently m aintained and operated its facilities .228 Rely­
ing on Knight for the proposition that " there is no duty of care to 
protect a sports participant against risks of injury that are inherent in 
the sport itself," the court held that "hazardous n atural forest obsta­
cles" are inherent risks of skiing, and it affirmed summary j udgment in 
favor of the defendant.229 
In the following year, 1995 , a skier who collided with a ski lift tower 
and sustained multiple fractures and partial paralysis claimed that the 
metal tower was inadequately padded.230 Relying on Knight's ap­
proach to assumed risk and the list of inherent risks described in 
Danieley and the Michigan Ski Act,23 l the court in Connelly v. Mam­
moth Mountain Ski Area found that " collisions with ski lift towers and 
their components" constitute an inherent risk,  and it concluded that 
the defendant, Mammoth Mountain, had no duty to protect the plain­
tiff from such an accident.232 The court was unmoved by the plaintiffs 
claim that the defendant's failure to adequately pad the lift tower in­
creased the inherent risks of skiing, declaring that it knew of "no re le­
vant legal authority in California . . .  requiring a ski area operator to 
pad its ski lift towers. "233 
Similarly, in Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp . ,  an eight-year-old in­
termediate skier suffered facial lacerations, shattered teeth. and a 
fractured palate after she lost her balance and skied into the unpad­
ded nozzle of a snowmaking hydrant,234 Once again, the court in­
voked Knight to j ustify analyzing the case under the primary 
assumption of risk doctrine, and it referenced the catalogue of inher­
ent risks spelled out in Michigan's ski safety statute .  Rej ecting the 
227.  Vine v .  Bear Va lley Ski Co . . 13 Cal .  Rptr. 3d 370 (Ca l . Ct. App. 200.:1-) :  Solis v.  K irkwood 
Resort Co . .  1 1 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal .  Ct. App . 200 l ) .  
228. See O' Donoghue v.  B e a r  Mountain S k i  Resort. 35  Ca l .  Rptr.  2d 467. 468 ( Cal. Ct. App. 
1 994 ) . 
229. fri. at 468-69 (emphasis omitted) . 
230. See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area. 45 C a l .  Rptr. 2d 855. 857 ( Ca l .  Ct.  App. 
1995).  
231. For a discussion of Daniele)'. see slIpra notes 2 1 1 -2 1  t) and accompanying text.  
232. COllnelly. 45 Cal .  Rptr. 2d at  857-58 (emphasis omi t t e d ) .  
233 .  Id. at 1)58. 
234. D UA N E  M O R R IS. LLP . . S A M PLE LIST OF T R I A LS & S l l iYl iv!.-\ K 'r· J l l DGiYIENTS 1 3  (ON F I L l'  
\\lITH A l I T H O R ) . 
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cl aim that Squaw Valley had acted carelessly by not padding the hy­
drant ' s  nozz le ,  the court held that it was "not aware of any relevant 
l egal authority, and [had] not been directed to any, requiring a ski 
area operator to pad its plainly visible snowmaking equipment . " 235 
Even in California ,  however, courts have imposed some limits on 
the risk s  assumed by skiers. In Van Dyke v. s. K.I. Ltd. , a case involv­
ing a plaintiff who fractured his spine and was rendered paraplegic 
after he collided with a directional s ignpost (which ironical ly said " be 
aware-ski with care") on a slope at B ear Valley, the trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because "the 
risk of hitt ing something like th is ,  whether i t ' s  a signpost or a pole 
supporting a ski  l i ft or snow making equipment or trees, is a r i sk of 
injury that ' s  inherent in the sport. " 236 However, the appellate court 
dist inguished cases that involved ski towers from those that involve 
other objects. noting that the signpost in this case was difficult for the 
p laintiff and other skiers to see.2-'7 The owners and operators of ski 
areas,  the court concluded,  have a duty to ensure that signs on the 
s lopes are p la inly visible to al l  sk iers.23� On remand . however. the 
paraplegic p la intiff. who was an attorney. was also unable to pre­
vai J .23LJ After the plaintiff refused a sett lement offer of $500 ,000 and 
insi sted on a payment of over $3 mil l ion, the case was retri ed ,  result­
m g  111 a verdict for the defense .24o 
D. Comparing Liability for Ski Accidents in Vermont, 
Colorado, and Caiztorn ia 
I n  each of t he  three states in which we have examined legal contlicts 
over ski accidents, disputes are adjudicated by using the language of 
assumed and inherent risk . The ski industry has an important eco­
nomic presence in all of the states because they emp loy large numbers 
of people , attract tourists, and generate significant tax revenue . 
'Through a successful lobbying effort that aimed to minimize if not 
e l iminate resort l iability for the i njuries suffered by skiers ,  the ski in­
dustry secured legislation in Vermont and Colorado that codified the 
2 3 '> .  Id a t  3lJ3 . 
2-'6. Van Dvke v. S . K . 1 .  Ltd . . 79 Cal .  Rptr .  2e1 77'>. 777 & n.'> ( Ca l .  Cl. App. I l)l)i» ) .  
2 3 7 .  /il. at 777 .  779  ( " Van Dyke  cou lel not  see  t h e  face of  the �ign hecause he approached i t  a t  
�lbout a l)( )  degree angle.  None of Van Dyke's  s k i  companions saw t h e  s ign.  Indeed. two o f  them 
missed the crossover t ra i l . " ) .  
239. Dt · .. \ N E  i\l( ) R R l s .  L LP. S A 1V IPLE L I ST ( ) F  T K I ,\ I .S '-': St ' � I �'I ;\ R Y  J l ; [ )( ;1VIENTS I J ( o n  fi le with 
<t u thor ) .  
2-\0. PrclJ l is,'s !. illhilitl': A ccir/CIlI III S k i  A rea Defellse VerdiCl: PUUlp iegi(/ .  PF R<;ONAL IN .l l I K \  
Vi:: k U l ( j R f. \ s . .  O c t .  2 ) .  20( ) ( ) .  
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assumption of risk doctrine. Why no such legislation exists in Califor­
nia is unclear. Some attorneys h ave suggested that the industry was 
concerned about a backlash from the courts if it pressed for legisla­
tion , and others h ave speculated that the California legislature was 
less recept ive to ski safety legislation than were those in Vermont and 
Colorado. 24 1  
Even in the two states with protective legislation-Colorado and 
Vermont-the approaches of the state legislatures diverge . In Ver­
mont, the l egisla ture p assed an extremely general law stating that " a  
person who takes part i n  any sport accepts a s  a matter of law the dan­
gers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and necessary. " 242 
Lawmakers i n  Colorado tried a similar approach in  1979,  but dissatis­
faction \vith the results of cases reaching the courts caused the ski in­
dustry to pressure legislators for a far more specific law. which 
resulted in a series of amendments in 1990.243 The amended law is 
prefaced by a statement of concern about l itigation that "unnecessa­
rily increase [ s] Colorado ski area operators' costs , "244 and it goes on 
to catalogue the inherent dangers of skiing, including the following: 
changing weather condit ions; snow condit ions as they exist or may 
change. such as ice. hard pack, powder, packed powder,  wind pack, 
corn .  crust .  s lush , cut-up snow, and machine -made snow; surface or 
subsurface cond i tions such as bare spots, forest growth .  rocks. 
stumps,  streambeds. c l iffs, extreme terrain, and trees, or other natu­
ral  objects, and col l i s ions with such natural  objects; i mpact with l ift 
towers, s igns. posts. fences or enclosures, hydrants. water pipes.  or 
other man-made structures and their components: variat ions in 
steepness or terrain. whether natural or as a result of s lope design. 
snowmaking or groOl lling operations, including but not l im ited to 
roads .  freestyle terrai n ,  jumps, and catwalks  o r  other terrain modifi ­
cations: col l i s ions with other skiers; and the fai lure o f  skiers to ski  
within their own abi l i t ies .245 
Consequently. Vermont, Colorado, and California share the com­
mon lavv doctrine of assumed risk ,  and in each there is an economi­
cally important and politically powerful i ndustry seeking to avoid 
l iability for ski  accidents. Yet industry presence has not had a uniform 
impact . Instead , legislatures have taken different approaches in Ver­
mont and Colorado, and they have remained on the sidelines in Cali­
fornia .  Case outcomes have been similarly varied . Defendants have 
fared reasonably well in Vermont, but recent cases tha t  underscore ski 
2·+ 1 .  Te lepholl e:: i n terview Joh n E. Fagan. Partner. D uane Morris.  L L P  (Julle 6. 200i) ) .  
242. VI . SIYI . A N >.; .  t i t .  1 2 .  § [ 037 (2002 ) .  
243. See S/fpru l e x t  accompalwing notes 1 66- 1 6 9. 
244. [ ')l)( ) Coio.  Sess.  L:JWS [ 540. 
245. COL( ) R i \ .  ST.\T .  '� 33-·H- [03 (3 .5 )  (2006 ) .  
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industry duties raise the possibility that courts will begin apportioning 
liability in ski cases, in conformance with the state's comparative fault 
statute. Colorado's courts, despite the legislature 's  two efforts to limit 
the liability of ski resorts, have continued to play the role of the 
spoiler by engaging in detailed textual analysis of the meaning of "in­
herent risks " and reaching results that are surprisingly favorable to 
plaintiffs . California is perhaps the biggest anomaly: even in the ab­
sence of legislation that codifies the assumption of risk and shields the 
ski industry from liability, the courts have regularly sided with the in­
dustry at the expense of injured skiers. 
Why have the California courts, in the absence of a statute that cod­
ifies the assumption of risk doctrine ,  embraced a common law ap­
proach to assumed risk that is  more favorable to defendants than the 
most narrO\vly tailored legislation? And why have courts in st ates 
with legislation intended to shield the ski industry from liability 
thwarted the intent of the legislature and continued to award damages 
to at least some inj ured skiers? There are of course many differences 
between the states, and thus many possible comparative explanations. 
The general political profile of each state, for example, might affect 
the apportionment of tort liability in ski-related claims. Although 
Vermont, Colorado, and California are al l  "blue " states, California is 
the most l iberaL and Colorado is the most conservative of the three .24A 
To the extent that liberal values are equated with pro-plaintiff out­
comes, therefore, generalized political ideology does little to explain 
the outcome of the ski cases discussed herein. Perhaps a more fine­
grained examination of state politics would reveal that ski claims are 
more often brought to California courts that are located in the state's 
most conservative areas, while claims in Vermont and Colorado are 
more often heard by those states' most liberal locales. Our data are 
not sufficiently specific to enable such an analysis, but we are skeptical 
of the possibility of explaining the different outcomes of assumed risk 
cases with such crude political measures. 
In addition to the political configuration of the states, various other 
factors are worth examining to determine whether they have an im­
pact on the outcome of ski-related assumed risk cases. For example , 
the relative size and power of the ski industry, and its wil l ingness to 
expend resources in an effort to influence the legal process by, for 
example,  making contributions to judicial election campaigns, could 
alter the outcomes of ski cases. So too could the structure of the state 
2�6.  S('(' Stat is t ica l  Model ing. Causa l  In ference. and Socia l  Sc ience : Ranking States  hy the 
Li  beral ism/Conservatism of Their  Voters. h t tp ://w\Vw .stat.colum bia.edu/-cook/movable typel 
archives/::!OOi'106Irank ing_states.h t m l  (June 3D. 200i-). 24:53 EST) .  
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court system; for example ,  because Vermont has no intermediate ap­
pellate courts, the supreme court hears final appeals from all cases 
originating in tria l  courts, whereas both California and Colorado have 
intermediate appellate courts that insulate the supreme courts from a 
wide range of appeals . Different approaches to the apportionment of 
liability may also come into play.  In  Vermont, plaintiffs can recover 
even if they are no more than fifty percent at fault ,  while in Colorado 
only plaintiffs who are l ess at fault than defendants can recover.247 
California has a pure comparative fault rule,  which enables plai ntiffs 
to recover even if they are more than fifty percent at faulC�48 Yet 
none of these factors appears to explain the pattern of liability that we 
have observed. 
One explanation that finds some support in our research is that leg­
islative involvement appears to be counterproductive.  That is, when 
the legislature stays out of the way, the courts are inclined to treat 
skiers as having assumed the risk of injury on the slopes .24<) But when 
the legislature codifies assumed risk in an effort to shape judicial rul­
ings about ski accident cases, the courts are not easily contained. 250 
Judges on the California bench, for example, do not need to push back 
against the action of the legislature because the latter has not sought 
to legisl ate the outcomes of ski accident claims. By contrast, the exis­
tence of ski safety legislation may serve as an invitation for courts in  
Colorado to  grapple with the  imperfect efforts of  legisl atures to  codify 
the assumption of risk doctrine, and in doing so they find gaps in  the 
laws that enable plaintiff recovery. TIlis tendency may be exacerbated 
by judges who consider legislative involvement with the assumption of 
risk doctrine an inappropriate political intrusion into the common law 
and who want to reestablish what they believe to be the court 's legiti­
mate province. In short, without legislative codification of assumed 
risk shadowing and shaping their decisions ,  j udges in Cal ifornia have 
not felt the need to "fight" the legislation in their opinions. Ironically, 
the result is that the California courts are approaching the assumption 
of risk in ski cases j ust as the ski safety statutes in other states envision 
judicial action and outcomes . 
Yet, the apparent lack of legislation in California i s  compromised by 
two factors. First , California's courts have regularly looked to Michi-
2 4 7 .  Math isen.  Wickert & Lehrer.  S . c . .  Contributory Negligence/Co mpa rative Fau l t  Laws. 
http ://www.l11wl-law.col11/Practict:Areas/Contributory-N t:glegence .asp ( list ing sta tes with C O Il ­
trib utory and comparativt: negl igence laws ) .  
248. Li v .  Ye l low Cab C o  . . 532 P . 2 d  1 220. 1 229- 1 230 ( Ca l .  C t . App.  ] LJ75 ) .  
24LJ. See, e.g . . Souza v. S q u a \\' Va l ley Ski  Corp . .  41  Cal . Rptr. ,"kl 389.  3LJ I -92 ( Cal .  Ct.  App.  
20(0 ) .  
250. See, e.g . .  Rimkus v. N\\'. Coil).  S k i  Corp . . 7U6 F.2d 1000. lO6 1 ( lO th C i r.  l LJ83 ) .  
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gan's Ski  Area Safety Act for guidance on the assumed risk of skiing. 
In doing so, the courts have benefited from legislation that details the 
risks of skiing and the duties of skiers and ski resorts without feeling 
constrained by local e lected officials. Second, although the California 
state legislature has not enacted a ski safety statute, local government 
has ,  at times, stepped in to fil l  at least some of the gap . The most 
significant example is in Placer County, located in and around the Si­
erra Nevada Mountains, which is perhaps the most economically im­
portant ski region in  the state. Sugar Bowl, the first ski area in  the 
county, opened in 1939,  followed by Squaw Valley, Alpine Meadows, 
Homewood Ivlountain Resort, Royal Gorge , and Northstar-at­
Tahoe.25 1 Together, these six resorts have close to one hundred ski 
l ifts and have hosted prestigious international ski events like the 1 960 
Winter Olympics .252 In 1 984, the Placer County Board of Supervisors 
enacted a Skier Responsibility Code that echoes state ski safety stat­
utes by providing that " [a ] ny individual or group of individuals who 
engage in the sport of skiing of any type . . .  shall assume and accept 
the inherent risks of such activities insofar as the risks are reasonably 
obvious, foreseeable or necessary to the activities .  "253 The Code goes 
on to specify the inherent risks of skiing, as well as to spell out certain 
duties of skiers .254 Whatever the legal effect of Placer County 's  ordi­
nance-the California Supreme Court has not resolved either the 
question of whether Placer County's Skier Responsibility Code estab­
lishes a local duty that gives rise to tort liability or whether the crea­
tion of local duties means that similar acts of plaintiffs in different 
parts of the state would lead to different results in tort claims-it is 
clear that politics is as much a part of assumed risk in California as 
e lsewhere.255 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a powerful intuitive appeal to the idea that individuals who 
engage in risky activities should bear the costs of their accidents, and 
tort law has long captured that idea in the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. One need look no further than the legal conflict over smoking 
251. SACRAi\·IENTO REC; 'L  RESEA RCH INST . .  PLA CER COUNT,' ECONOIV'I IC ANI) D EIVI()( ; RA I'HIC 
P ROFILE  200R.  at 1 1 2  fig. 79 ( Feb.  200S).  avai/able al http ://www.placcr.ca.gov/News/200B/M arch/ 
DemoProfile .aspx. 
252. Id. at  1 1 2 & fig . 7,). 
253. Placer County Code §§ ') .28.0 1 0 .  ').2R.030 (2009 ) .  
254. Id. §§  9.2B.O"IO t o  9.28.060. 
255. See Cheong v .  AnlabJin. ')46 P.2d 8 1 7. 824-26. 82� ( Ca l .  1 9') 7 ) .  in which the j ust ices 
staked out a range of d i ffering posi t ions on the impact of a loca l  ord inance on Ca l i fornia's COIll­
mon law ot (orts .  
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for an example of how the American public has internalized the view 
that risk-takers are responsible for the consequences of their actions. 
Smokers suffering from lung cancer and other diseases began to sue 
tobacco companies in the 1950s, relying heavily on a series of epidemi­
ological studies that demonstrated a link between smoking and vari­
ous health problems.250 As evidence of a causal relationship between 
smoking and cancer became increasingly indisputable ,  sick smokers 
continued to bring claims of both negligence and strict liability against 
the tobacco industry.257 Even more smokers filed cases with the 
courts after internal company documents. which indicated that the in­
dustry had intentionally misled the public about the dangers of smok­
ing, were made public.258 Yet for over forty years after the first cases 
were filed,  plaintiffs fai led to recover, and their success was only mar­
ginally improved when the scientific basis of their claims was strength­
ened and the malfeasance of the industry came to light .259 Although 
there are a number of reasons for the failure of smokers '  tort claims, 
among the most important is that j uries consistently found that smok­
ers made an informed decision to smoke. and as a result , they were 
responsible for the consequences of their decision. Having "assumed 
the risk "  of smoking, in  other words, smokers gave up the opportunity 
of recovering for their injuries .  
Although j uries have consistently found arguments based on the 
idea of the assumed risk  of smoking to be compel ling, many tort law 
scholars and a number of influential judges have been sharply critical 
of the doctrine of assumption of risk .2nD Like Justice Felix Frankfurter 
more than a half-century ago , leading contemporary tort l aw thinkers 
continue to write lengthy, doctrinally sophisticated pieces that pick 
apart the idea of assumed risk and advocate that it be e liminated from 
the lexicon of tort law. The result is a curious misfit between the 
"common sense" of the public, as expressed by juries ,  and the views of 
learned experts like scholars and judges. 
In this Article ,  we have stepped back from the polarized doctrinal 
debate over the assumption of risk doctrine and focused on the sociol­
ogy and politics of assumed risk. Skiing is an ideal window through 
which to examine the assumption of risk doctrine because determining 
liability for ski accidents requires a complex balancing of three key 
256. See Robert L. Rabin. A Socio/egll/ liis 10 rI '  of Ill e To /wcco J()J'r Litigorio/l, 44 STAN. L 
REV .  k53. 856-57 ( 1 992) .  
?57.  ld. 
LiS. S('e Robert L. Ra b i n .  The 7hi,-t! H'({ \ ' ( " of To /Jucc() '/ iJri L iliglilio/ l .  ill R H ; !  ; L X fl N G  To· 
B r\CCO 1 76.  1 85 ( Robert L Rabin & Stephen D .  Sugarma n  eels . . 20m ) .  
2 5 0 .  M a t  1 7 (). 1 85 .  
2flf). SeC' SII/)lI/ n o t e s  45·-- 1 ( ) '} a n d  clccompanving tex ! .  
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factors: the knowledge that skiing is dangerous and will inevitably 
cause some injuries: the deeply ingrained individualism of American 
legal culture that calls for skiers to be accountable for their own ac­
tions; and the tort goals of deterrence and risk-spreading, which coun­
sel that resort owners and operators should have an incentive to offer 
skiers a reasonably safe skiing environment .26 1 Litigation over ski ac­
cidents in Vermont, Colorado, and California illustrates how the lan­
guage of assumed risk is used as shorthand to discuss the clash 
between individual freedom to engage in risky activities and the gen­
eral duty of care that requires people to act reasonably so as to reduce 
accidental harm to others. The wide-ranging and contradictory case 
holdings in the three states make clear that there is  no recipe for how 
that balance should be struck.  Regardless of its flaws , the language of 
assumed risk captures the tension between individual freedom, per­
sonal responsibility , and the prevention of unexpected risk, and 
neither scholars nor courts have found an alternative formulation that 
has wide appeal .  In sum, the doctrine of assumed risk has withstood 
decades of criticism because of its resonance with society-as seen in 
jury decisions-and of its utility to courts and l awyers. Despite com­
pelling and consistent academic critique, the assumption of risk doc­
trine remains firmly embedded in tort l aw, and there is no sign that it 
is likely to disappear. 
The interaction of tort doctrine with social values and bel iefs ,  how­
ever, is only part of the reason why the assumption of risk doctrine 
has remained a critical part of tort l aw. Equally important, we argue, 
is the impact of political and economic interests on the determination 
of the types of risks that are assumed and the al location of accident 
costs when such risks lead to injuries. The ski industry and the insur­
ance industry remain critically interested in how the cost of ski acci­
dents is apportioned . and together they have lobbied aggressively for 
state ski safety statutes that shield the industry from liability.202 From 
one perspective , they have been extremely successful :  every major ski 
state except California h as passed some form of legislation that pro­
tects ski resort owners and operators from personal injury liability. 
Yet .  as we demonstrated in our discussion of ski accident cases in Ver­
mont ,  Colorado, and California ,  courts have varied widely in their in­
terpretation of the statutes. And despite the absence of protective 
legislation , the California courts have been the least accommodating 
26 1 .  Scc gell(!ro{h' L\W K ENlE M. FRI EDMA N. TOTAL j PSTICE ( I  ':1:-)5 ) (discuss ing the high de­
gree tl l  which A m e ricans h a \'c developed expectat ions of recompense for whatever in juries they 
:;urfc r ) .  
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to plaintiffs . In short , what may appear to be a jurisprudential and 
doctrinal debate over the assumption of risk is in fact powerfully 
shaped by the political , economic, and cultural climate in which the 
debate has taken place. 
It should not be surprising that legal doctrines�in this case , the 
assumption of risk doctrine�are a product not simply of jurispruden­
tial considerations but also of economics, politics, and social  values. 
Generations of legal sociologists have made that point with great suc­
cess in the legal academy.263 When it comes to the assumption of risk 
doctrine, however, it seems that their message has been forgotten. 
'With almost no exceptions, the literature on assumed risk is doctrinal, 
and even scholars who often highlight the political or sociological 
d imensions of tort doctrine have been drawn into a more conven­
tional ,  technical debate. In this Article ,  we have argued that it is more 
useful to analyze how the assumption of risk doctrine operates in 
practice than to parse hypotheticals. The scholarly community may 
distain the phrase " assumption of risk , "  but it needs to examine care­
fully how and when attorneys for defendants and plaintiffs invoke the 
assumed risk doctrine, the ways in which j udges and j uries use the 
concept to j ust ify their rulings , and the reasons why politicians codify 
the assumption of risk doctrine in legislation. Not doing so threatens 
to make tort scholars secondary players in an important and ongoing 
conversation about the allocation of the cost of accidents in a wide 
range of so-called risky activities. 
263.  See. e .g . .  LAW & SOC I ET Y :  RE A D IN(iS O N  1'1 1 1' S ( )CIAL STl I I )Y ( ) F L\w (S (cwart M acaUlay.  
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